Though Norway indeed has more to bring to the table than mere precious oil-money, this statement does nevertheless quite accurately points out the strengths of the abovementioned actors in the process of changing the authoritarian stalemate in Belarus.

As for sharing a common history that stretches back well beyond the Soviet interlude, Lithuania is arguably the EU country which possess the greatest experience and most profound understanding of Belarus.

This is maybe the main reason for the assertiveness with which Lithuania has acted as the self-proclaimed voice of the Belarusian opposition within the EU. There has been more than one occasion when Lithuania’s political representatives has entered high-level international summits followed by members of the Belarusian opposition, much to the dismay of their Western colleges.

Lithuania has, as such, consistently provided the Belarusian opposition with a platform from which it has been able to draw the attention to the practices of a regime that the EU, some experts argue, has chosen to turn their backs on. The reason for this has, prior to the armed conflict in Georgia, mainly been EU’s reluctance to antagonize Russia, although the relations between Minsk and Moscow during the recent years have proven to be less than lukewarm.

The Nordic states, then, have been significantly more active in Belarusian affairs compared to the EU at large; mainly because of their relative independence of Russian energy sources and pronounced concern for human rights issues. Although striving to fulfil basically the same goals, the approach towards Belarusian society and the regime has traditionally varied between Lithuania and the Nordic states; whereas the former has preferred to use diplomatic channels in order to foster political and social change, the latter has favoured to conduct relations within the framework of foreign aid projects.

In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian crisis, much of the attention has been focused on the Eastern Partnership Programme (EaP), designed and elaborated jointly by Poland and Sweden. Although the Belarusian regime has been showing some interest in participating in the programme, critics have been fast to point out its many weaknesses. One might, for example, question whether the fairly modest funds available for modernization and development initiatives would be of any significant attraction to the regime, especially so since it is to be regarded as mere pin-money compared to the vast debt Belarus has incurred from Russia.

However, while the critique indeed may be accurate, it would be naïve to believe that the implementation of the EaP, regardless of the size of the funds underpinning the programme, would ensue in the unconditional accommodation of political conditionality or the undertaking of an immense reform programme reminiscent of perestroika. Instead, the strengths of the EaP lie in its elaborate mechanisms to promote reform in certain key institutions which, in turn, is envisioned to gradually change the mindset of society. Hence, the main long-term aim being to absorb Belarus into the European orbit.

It was against this backdrop of a revitalized dialogue with Belarus that the EU launched its policy of “engagement”, with the aim to break the self-imposed isolation of the country. This development should indeed be viewed as encouraging, especially so since the EU, until recently, seems to have equated Alexander Lukashenka with Belarus, which is to play right into the hands of the dictator. Moreover, with the apartheid regime in South Africa being the exception that proves the rule, efforts to isolate regimes which fails to comply with the rules of conduct set by the international community has, time and again, proven to be unsuccessful at best, and disastrous at worst.

However, though the policy of “engagement” seems as a promising initiative as it aims to increase interaction between the EU and Belarus, there is other vital actors, apart from a capricious regime and a muzzled opposition, involved in the struggle for democratization and reform which deserves the attention and support from the EU. In order to achieve long-term and sustained social and political change it will be of fundamental importance to create arenas for socio-cultural interaction and exchange between EU citizens and Belarusian people in general, and youth in particular.

As for now, the lion’s share of EU’s foreign aid is channelized into support for the fragmented Belarusian opposition. Notwithstanding the fact that that the beleaguered opposition forces are filling a political void in Belarusian society and therefore should be accommodated with all means possible, one should also acknowledge that this approach so far has produced rather meagre results. Instead of concentrating funds solely on the endorsement of the Belarusian opposition, it seems vital that money should be distributed among a larger number of social actors, and especially those who contribute to enhance the dialogue between Belarusian and Western civic groupings.

Lithuania had, prior to entering the Schengen agreement, adopted a fairly generous visa regime vis-à-vis Belarus which made is possible for Belarusian citizens to obtain a temporary visa to a considerably lower price than that which were stipulated within the Schengen zone. It is of course impossible to measure or correctly assess the impact this kind of policy could have on Belarusian society, but it seems plausible enough to suggest that the experience of interacting with people and institutions within a democratic society could stimulate a change of perception about the blunt authoritarianism prevailing in one’s own society. This policy unfortunately had to change as Lithuania had to comply with EU regulations on a common visa regime when acceding to the Schengen agreement in 2007.

A policy in the Nordic states which seems to have been equally efficient in terms of increasing the prospects of democratization in Belarus through cultural and social interaction was that of a free and universal university education. This meant that Belarusian students, among others, could receive a free university education of their choice and the possibility to indulge in social activities outside the narrow confines prevailing within their own society.

In 2006 Denmark decided to delimit the number of foreign students with the possibility to receive free university education by stipulating that only students from within the EEC and Switzerland were to be granted this opportunity. Finland and Sweden followed suit in 2009 when their respective parliaments passed a similar law. Consequently, the dismantling of this particular institution does not only increase inequality, as it is students from the most prosperous countries that remain unobligated to pay for their education, but it might also have dire consequences, albeit indirectly, for the prospects of enhancing democratization.

Nonetheless, apart from these setbacks, it will be interesting to see how Lithuania and the Nordic states will develop its efforts to enhance the prospects for democratization in Belarus, and how they are to act within the new EU policy framework of “engagement”. What is clear, however, is that their positions as forerunners in this process are likely to continue.

Although there are few incitements to coordinate efforts and policymaking within the field of foreign aid outside the framework provided by the EU, considering the disparities in the approach between the Nordic states on the one hand and Lithuania on the other, such an attempt could nevertheless be beneficial for both parties.

Though Lithuania may lack the funds, skills and experience of conducting foreign aid in the elaborated manner established in the Nordic states, the latter’s expertise in this field has, to a great extent, been acquired through collaboration with the Baltic States during the phase of reconstruction and transitional ordeal. Prior to the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, Nordic, and especially Swedish foreign policy, had an ideological penchant for “palm-leaf socialism” in the Third World and were likely to target experimental regimes with little respect for human rights. Among the beneficiaries were Robert Mugabe, Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega, just to name a few. Consequently, given their understanding of Belarusian culture and society, Lithuania should, in this perspective, definitely possess the skills to evaluate and outline the apparent strength and weaknesses of Nordic foreign aid.

It might also be in place with a reminder of that Lithuania will take over EU’s rotating presidency in 2013. And although the powers invested in the presidency do not give Lithuania the prerogatives to direct EU’s unwieldy machinery after its own accord, it does nonetheless bestow Lithuania with the privilege to shape the agenda.

This has intermittently proven to be a distinct advantage as far as foreign policymaking is concerned. When Sweden held the presidency in 2001 and Denmark in 2002, their joint efforts paved the way for the 2004 “big bang” enlargement which ensued in that Latvia and Lithuania was granted membership together with those Central and Eastern European countries which previously were deemed to be far ahead in the accession process.

In 2013, therefore, Lithuania will be given the possibility to turn the EU’s attention towards its post-Soviet eastern neighbours. Though the short-term advantages of such an approach may turn out to be modest, it should be viewed as an opportunity for Lithuania to play a significant role in EU’s foreign policy making, and the effort would most certainly be met with acclaim among the people residing southeast of the Lithuanian border.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.Other articles by Fredrik RydströmEurovision Song Contest and European integration

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Lithuania’s white gold

Teachers and pupils; LGBT, Lithuania and Nordics

BaltoScandia:to have (or not) a laugh at the expense of your neighbours

Minister A.Ažubalis noted that as the OSCE chairmanship,Lithuania would aim to continue the dialogue on European security (the Corfu Process) and called on the EU member states to take a common position with regard to the process.

Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the 8th Baltic Sea States Summit that took place on 1-2 June in Vilnius and the activities of the Council of the Baltic Sea States to the participants of the meeting.

Head of Lithuania’s diplomacy said that he regarded the CBSS as a key regional forum for political discussions with the EU member states, Russia, Norway and Iceland participating in it.

Minister A.Ažubalis acquainted the participants of the meeting with Lithuania’s opinion about the EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and highlighted the importance of ensuring funding for the Strategy and the necessity to allocate more EU’s support to the infrastructure and energy projects of the region.

During the meeting, the energy security in Europe, EU-Russia relations, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the implementation of the EU Eastern Partnership initiative were also discussed.

The ministers discussed the conference that would be held on 20 July in Kabul. Minister A.Ažubalis expressed concern about the slow progress in Afghanistan.

The Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and German foreign ministers – A.Ažubalis, Aivis Ronis, Urmas Paet and Guido Westerwelle – attended the meeting in Tallinn. The next meeting will be held in Germany in 2011.

To be sure, although the majority of songs represented may carry the worn-out themes of world peace, eternal love, wild dancing and Hard Rock Hallelujah; Eurovision Song Contest has nevertheless quite frequently been used to convey a more profound political message.

Portugal, the least successful country in the history of the competition, was, for example, following the Carnation revolution in 1974, for several years in a row dedicating their Eurovision entries to lamenting the yoke of fascism and to eulogizing the overthrowing of the regime.    

In a similar vein, when the contest took place in Kiev in 2005 after the victory of Ruslana the previous year in Istanbul, the Ukrainians chose the rather obscure rap-band “Greenjolly” to represent their country. The song paid homage to the newly appointed President, Viktor Yushchenko, and the triumph of the orange revolution. 

Most well-known, however, is perhaps the supposed Georgian entry of 2009 entitled: “We don’t wanna Put In”. Because of its blatant attack on the Russian Prime Minister in the aftermath of the armed conflict in Georgia the summer of 2008, Georgia was expelled from competition that year (they were actually given a choice to change the lyrics but refused).         

The Georgia-Russia crisis is however far from the only regional conflict which has been reflected in the competition. The worst scandal associated with these conflicts occurred in 2009 when the competition definitely left its imprint on the ongoing Ngorno-Karaback conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azeri television was accused of leaving out the Armenian entry in their broadcast while showing another country’s representative instead. Equally distressing was that several of those few Azeri citizens who chose to cast their vote on the Armenian contestant subsequently were paid a visit by the Secret Service. Some of the victims of the contemptible act of government oppression were even interrogated and charged with “unpatriotic behaviour”, and accused of being a threat against national security.

Though the old EU member states has grown increasingly disenchanted with the competition against the backdrop of increasingly poor results and enlargement fatigue, the line of development has, with a few exceptions, been the complete opposite in the majority of post-communist countries and accession states. As for being considered as the periphery of Europe, many of these states views participation in Eurovision Song Contest as an opportunity to open up a window towards Europe, and a chance to share something of themselves on an international arena which is regularly overcrowded or even closed for them. Consequently, scoring a victory in the competition has, time and again, proven to boost confidence and fuel support for Europeanization.

This was certainly the case with Estonia, Latvia and Turkey when they won in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. In the aftermath of the victories top-level politicians in all three countries emphatically declared that they now found themselves on the threshold to Europe and was banging on the door to Brussels. These statements shortly proved to be more than wishful thinking in the case of the former two.

Belarus has arguably been most obsessed among the post-communist states with winning the competition. In fact, the political establishment has stopped close to nothing in order to ensure victory, and it is obvious that the regime is attracted by the international prestige and recognition that follows from organizing the event.   

The conspicuous efforts to promote the country’s representatives have been growing increasingly bizarre over the years, and have so far not been crowned with success. When the competition was held in Moscow in 2009 the Belarusian delegates brought with them huge amounts of various merchandises to be distributed among international journalists, including Belarusian vodka named after their singer, Pjotr Elfimov, which came complete with his picture printed on the bottle. Not everything went according to the plan however. The three tons of ice cream, specially produced for the occasion, melted away shortly after arrival in Moscow as the Belarusian delegation had failed to attain proper freezers and cooling equipment from the Russian organizers.           

Moreover, the accession process in Estonia, which suffered a complete standstill in the beginning of 2001 because of the declining public support for the EU, regained momentum as a result of the unexpected victory in Eurovision Song Contest in 2001. The amount of voters who claimed to be in favour of EU accession was roughly 52 percent in the beginning of 2001, while the tables had turned to such an extent that approximately 64 percent of the population declared that they were going to vote yes in the 2003 referendum in the aftermath of the 2002 Estonian organization of the contest.

What we have seen in recent years is the total transformation of the competition from a fairly nominal Western European music event (notwithstanding the fact that Yugoslavia was represented in the competition since 1961) into an increasingly unwieldy but colourful European integration project. This development has naturally enough not been applauded by everyone, and has gradually become the subject of fierce debates in Western Europe, especially in the wake of the immense successes on behalf of Eastern Europe in the competition during recent years. 

It is interesting to note that the criticism or downright opposition against the enlargement of Eurovision Song Contest, by and large, follows the pattern recognizable from the debate about EU enlargements. Here, too, the large EU states are spearheading the formation of resistance against European expansion. While these states has been able to safeguard their prerogatives within the EU through the voting system which reflects the size of their population, their self-proclaimed role as the overseers of the competition has been guaranteed as the rules stipulate that Spain, Germany, France and the UK are directly qualified to the final together with the previous year’s winner.

This may sound harsh. To be true, although “the big four” in general and the UK in particular are the main proponents of a division of Eurovision Song Contest into one Western and one Eastern European camp, their claims has, time and again, been backed up by those few Western European states which still, by and large, takes the competition seriously; namely Sweden and Belgium. It is, of course, also fairly easy to read too much into the politicization of the event.

However, the parallels between the opposition against an eastward EU-enlargement and the supposed Eastern European domination in Eurovision Song Contest nevertheless show some substantial similarities. Terry Wogan, UKs legendary host, renown for his sarcasm and wittiness, who commented the competition for British broadcasting for 38 years, bitterly asserted prior to Russia’s win in 2008 that: “If we (the UK) don’t do well this time, a new musical iron curtain will fall down past the Danube”.Although Terry Wogan and his followers have presented various explanations for the existence of a conspiracy-like Eastern domination of the competition and reasons to why the alleged Eastern European usurpation of it has to be effectively thwarted, these does mainly fall behind three distinct categories which, taken as a whole, is reminiscent of the critic that has been, and still is, targeted against the EU-enlargement: 
The first argument against the enlargement of the competition is of course that of money. Eurovision Song Contest is today largely financed by “the big four”: Germany, Spain, France and the UK whose generosity has been awarded with a permanent place in the final. Why, then, should economically undeveloped countries in the margin of Europe be allowed to participate when these states, if they would win, hardly have the resources to organize the contest? Why should British and French taxpayers finance a grandiose PR event for a remote country of which they have little or no interest in? However, if it is to any consolations to the poor taxpayers, the greatest share of their money is not earmarked for the organizer itself, but goes to pay of engineers, choreographs and camera men involved in making the competition an eye-catching TV-event. Since the majority of them are from the Nordic states, at least the money stays within Western European pockets.

Then we have the cultural immaturity of the new participants. Some commentators seems to believe that decades of seclusion, when the Eastern European states were firmly looked behind the Iron Curtain, has ensued in a cultural degeneration, and that they therefore lack the capacity to see the beauty and virtue of Western styled music. After all, if one are to judge on the basis of the voting patterns, Eastern Europeans seems fairly indifferent towards the legacy of ABBA, Celine Dion, Domenico Modugno (Volare) and other revered apostles of (Western) European music. Consequently, their common inability to follow in the footprints of the masters should not be considered as nothing short of blasphemy.  

Finally, what has been anathematized by most offended Western Europeans is the alleged bloc-voting apparent in the Central and Eastern Europe region, which, the saying goes, has made it virtually impossible for Western European states to obtain the appreciation they so well deserve. Furthermore, the strong cultural and political bonds between post-communist countries has ensued in that they almost certainly vote for each other, and the cultural powerhouses of the region such as Russia, Ukraine and Turkey in particular, while leaving Western European participants with some mere scrap points.

Sure, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey can usually be found among the top-ten in the final result, and the Slavic post-communist states definitely has some kind of cultural love connection judging from the previous years voting patterns, while Cyprus has awarded Greece the highest point possible since 1996. However, is this really that different from the traditional reflection of national affiliations between Western European states? The bonds between, for example, Ireland and the UK or Sweden and Norway have been proven to be more or less equally strong and perennial throughout the history of the competition.

Indeed, in 2008, Alan Howard, an expert on Human Geography from the University of Reading asserted, after having analyzed tactics and voting patterns from previous years competitions, that: “In general it seems that culture rather than politics is most important. Countries in Eastern Europe may well share a cultural affinity but in recent years the contest winner has garnered support from both East and West.”  

When Norway won the competition last year most critics were silenced. After all, Norway is firmly located in Western European soil unlike Finland which, when managing to the bring the festival to Helsinki for the first time in Eurovision history in 2006, was characterized as being a Eastern European state with a Western façade. However, this was not enough for the antagonists of enlargement whom, in this years competition, reintroduced jury voting. The reason for this, they explained, was to crack down on bloc-voting. Nevertheless, one can also interpret the change of rules as a strategy employed to circumvent the impact of direct voting, and especially those votes emanating from Central and Eastern European states. At any case, the final result was that Germany became the first of “the big four” to score a victory since 1997. 

This has so far been an exclusive Western European debate and voices from the other side of the “musical Iron Curtian” have been fairly absent. Those who have scolded the alleged omnipotence of Eastern Europe in the competition even found a mascot in the 2008 Irish Eurovision entry Dustin the Turkey, a puppet doll, which deliberately tried to make a mockery of the development. Yet Eastern Europe remained silent. However, this year Lithuania, the only Baltic State that so far has failed to score a victory in the competition, participated with a song that, though highly ironic, managed to touch upon the issue. In their own sarcastic way the Lithuanian entry, InCulto, sang that:  “No Sir we’re not equal no, though we are both from the EU. We build your homes and wash your dishes, keep your hands all soft and clean. But one of these days you’ll realize Eastern Europe is in your genes”. The Lithuanian performance pretty much sums it all up: irony, politics, camp dancing and silvery underwear all in one eye-catching mixture.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.

The Lithuanian leader stressed the need to remove the artificial barriers for integration of the Baltic Sea Region and the rest of Europe. For this, the President said, me must establish power and transport connections, encourage people-to-people contacts, develop relations between non-governmental organizations, businesses and the cultural community, and promote shared values in environmental protection.

“I have no doubt that by pooling our efforts we will create an economically prosperous and easily accessible Baltic Sea Region, which is attractive to live in and to visit and which is safe and secure,” the President of Lithuania said, underlining that the vision of the Baltic Sea region’s future is founded on faster and deeper integration.

The CBSS Summit is attended by the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, Iceland’s Prime Minister Johanna Sigurdardottir, Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis, Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, Finland’s Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, also deputy prime ministers from Denmark, Russia and Sweden, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski, and the Chair of the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference Christina Gestrin.

The goal of the exercise is to develop action plans by the Baltic States defence sectors together with other state institutions for due and adequate simultaneous reception, staging and onward movement of allied and support units over the territory of all the Baltic States.

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, U.S. European and Naval Striking and Support Force NATO, as well as for the first time – Denmark, Poland, Norway and Germany, participates in the exercise.

The execution of the training task, providing allied forces, is monitored according to a previously developed scenario that is based on fictional events. Scenario focuses on a pre-crisis situation in a region, and the general activities are targeted towards achieving the adjustment and elimination of the circumstances provoking the crisis situation.

The tasks set up by the EU in order to assure a sustainable development and an eco-efficient economy have been meet with a varying degree of enthusiasm in the member states, and compliance has been unequally distributed geographically. In general, although there are exceptions, the post-communist member states, including Lithuania, are lagging behind in the overall process.

There are various reasons for this and they would best be analyzed on a national rather than on a regional basis. What the majority of these states have in common, however, is, if to compare with the Western European member states, the relatively low priority the electorate assigns to the issue of climate change and an eco-efficient economy. The political life, then, is accordingly dominated by “bread-and-butter” issues rather than those associated with an eco-efficient lifestyle. It is, seen from this perspective, understandable that the political establishment, though more or less unanimously paying lip-service to the EU agenda on how to combat climate change, in practice invariably appears less than lukewarm to adopt, implement and enforce legislation. The widespread lack of public awareness, concern and funding has intermittently ensued in sheer neglect of or outright opposition against coping with stringent EU rules. Brussels, in turn, has, time and again, quite rightfully been accused of setting excessive and economically unbearable targets for “the less prosperous member states”.

In the case of Lithuania, the greatest shortcomings can be registered in those sectors in need of the utmost investments of both financial capital and human resources. The development of waste management is, for example, still on an embryonic level, and though national jurisdiction has become stricter, legal circumventions are common and industries continue to dispose their bio-degradable waste in landfills as their major option.

The programme to renovate and increase the energy efficiency of dilapidating Soviet era multi-dwelling buildings does constitute an even greater concern. The initial project, aimed to realize the renovation of approximately 27 000 multi-dwelling buildings (70 percent of the total stock), were brought to a near standstill during the financial crisis, and the government has perforce revaluated the project by decreasing the highly overextended targets. What makes the impending renovation project of the building stock a highly prioritized political goal, apart from environmental concern, is the energy inefficiency of the prevailing structure. Housing amounts to about 27 percent of Lithuania’s total energy consumption.

Indeed, these are enormous projects, which requires, apart from immense financial investments, the active involvement of and participation between government agencies, banks and several EU institutions. However, the idea of an eco-efficient economy starts with the individual and his or her pattern of consumption. Food consumption is arguably the most important aspect of this pattern as food production is responsible for well over 20 percent of the total emission of greenhouse gases within the EU. In this field, Lithuania is not only doing comparatively well, but in some aspects even surpassing its wealthier Western neighbours.

What should be noted is that the unsustainable and wasteful pattern of food consumption prevalent in today’s developed economies rose as an issue on the agenda of policymakers and the public opinion relatively recently. In 2007, UK became first in the EU to systematically examine and estimate the amount of food waste each domestic household generated. The initial results proved chocking enough for the British government to result in the mounting of a major public awareness campaign: “Love Food Hate Waste”.

Similar surveys and similar campaigns have been carried out in most Western European member states since then, and the results have, on the whole, been equally distressing. The amount of purchased food products each household throws in the trash bin, that is to say the actual amount of food waste, is estimated to about 30 percent in the UK, 27 percent in Sweden, and 25 percent in Norway. However, in the Central and Eastern European region, the amount of food waste is by approximation less than ten percent, although comparatively few substantial scientific investigations yet has been carried out in this field of research.

As for always being in the front line when issues of the environment is concerned, the sounding of the alarm horn has definitely changed the patterns of consumption in the Nordic states, and Sweden in particular; the latter being the country in Europe where consumers are most zealous in terms of adhering to the eco-efficient lifestyle. Those people who can afford to live up to the highly placed social expectations of ecological conciseness and consumerist behaviour are, as an example, likely to eschew fruits and vegetables sold at the supermarket in favour of assuring deliverance of ecologically produced, albeit often deformed, pears and carrots from the local farmer.

The food processing industry has adapted to the rules of the game and is now largely shaping the pattern of eco-efficient consumption. Commercials for oatmeal are, for example, not attempting to appeal to potential customers in the old fashion way, by highlighting the quality or price of the product, but the company tries to attract customers by asserting that the left-over parcels will be used as bio-energetic fuel. Finally, as for being the second biggest consumer in the world, coffee, which hardly can be produced locally, should preferably carry a label which confirms that the producer meets stringent environmental standards and that the labour force involved in its production enjoys appropriate working conditions and are paid accordingly.

The concept of an eco-efficient lifestyle has thus made significant progress in the Nordic states in general, and Sweden in particular. Healthy, locally produced and climate friendly food has become an increasingly compelling mantra in the minds of consumers. Moreover, adopting a climate friendly lifestyle has rapidly begun to be viewed as a moral duty on the part of the consumers; a notion enthusiastically used and reiterated for commercial purposes by the food processing industry.

Though Nordic consumers and advocates of the eco-efficient lifestyle indeed are inclined to pad themselves on the shoulder, there are still several reasons to be self-critical and to broaden the horizons. There are still aggravating problems, albeit rarely discussed, in the general pattern of Western European food consumption and waste management.

Meat consumption, for example, is, from an ecological point of view, still suffering from the effects of the “mad-cow disease” hysteria. The neat packaging of bone-free meat products in today’s supermarkets, supposedly ensuring enhanced quality, have unquestionably decreased the variety of products being put up for sale, and therefore increased the amount of waste. The practice of turning the unwanted parts of the animal into minced meat has not alleviated the problem as the market for this kind of product is already saturated. Basically the same thing can be said about poultry. Western European consumers seem to believe that the fillet is the only piece of the chicken worth to sink one’s teeth into. How to dispose of the left-over parts is, of course, of a lesser concern.

This problem, I would argue, is virtually unknown in Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours. When visiting the meat section in a regular turgus (open market/fair), one can not fail to notice the impressive assortment of products behind the counters, many of them alien to a Western European consumer. Although the turgus, even in Lithuania, frequently is perceived as a “poor man’s market”, it is, in some aspects, far superior to any Western European styled supermarket as far as eco-efficiency is concerned.

Lithuanian consumers are, furthermore, equally or more concerned than their Nordic neighbours about the origin and quality of their food. In the minds of Lithuanians, food should preferably be locally produced as it, in their understanding, ensures good quality, and though Lithuanian consumers rarely mention the ecological factor being important for their choice of food purchases, it is nevertheless obvious that they consider locally produced and organic food being preferable to cheaper products from foreign countries.

Indeed, those studies being made on the subject suggest that approximately 80 percent of Lithuanians find it important that their food products has been produced locally, and although young people tend to care less about from where and under what conditions their food has been produced, the statistical differences between age groups is remarkably small. In general, Lithuanian consumers are likely to believe that domestic food has a “familiar taste, is fresh, with less preservatives and with reliable quality”. No climate awareness campaigning needed. Albeit for dissimilar reasons, Lithuanian consumers, then, show the same level of appreciation for an eco-efficient pattern of food consumption as their quite recently converted Nordic neighbours.

Though it seems too far-fetched to assert that the experience of a shortage economy and transitional ordeal proved to be a blessing in disguise, there are other aspects of the Soviet heritage than dilapidating multi-dwelling buildings and inept waste management, which serves to be highlighted. While the concept of the eco-efficient economy, by and large, has been successfully promoted in Western Europe as a moral obligation and progressive lifestyle choice, the anticipated changes in consumerist behaviour is already firmly rooted in Lithuanian society.

Consequently, although the established pattern of food consumption in Lithuania may have fairly little to do with preferences for a certain lifestyle, as it initially was brought on society out of necessity, the level of awareness about and appreciation for eco-efficient food does nonetheless, in some instances, even exceed that of the most ardent Western European states.

It will therefore be interesting to follow the development of consumerist behaviour in Lithuania as well as in the other Baltic States. Will the turgus tradition manage to prevail and coexist with expansionist retail chains in the long-run? And is the new generation, growing up under more prosperous economic conditions, going to follow in the footsteps of their parental generation and adopt similar patterns of consumerist behaviour?

Moreover, this development should be closely observed by the food processing industry and food retail chains in Western European states. Having in mind the level of ecological consciousness among consumers in the Baltic States, these firms, who already has acclimatized to and profited from the increased tendency of eco-efficient behaviour in the domestic market, should, in the long-run, find fertile ground for the introduction of healthy, climate friendly and eco-efficient food products in the Baltic markets.

In addition, notwithstanding the mushrooming of sushi bars, pizza places and Chinese restaurants in the Baltic states during recent years; if one holds a firm belief in the recommendations of the prominent Guide Michelin, Eastern European cuisine in general still appears rather meagre and in need of diversification. So far only two restaurants in the region have been awarded a star in the prestigious guide (Hungary and Czech Republic). In comparison, Copenhagen alone has eleven star-awarded restaurants. In the case of Lithuania, abandoning the repulsive habit of pouring tremendous amounts of ketchup on pizzas would, in my view, be a great start on the quest for Michelin stars.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.

The figures are based on factors that influence the health of the mother and baby including access to health care and education.

Norway came in first followed by Australia in second place and Iceland and Sweden in equal third place.

Though Lithuania is behind Estonia, which landed at 17th place, it bested Latvia in 25th place.

Lithuania also came in higher than developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Luxembourg and Russia.

Afghan women have the worst conditions in the world according to the study.

Criminal networks of Lithuanian origin has been involved in revolutionizing smuggling of narcotics to the Nordic states; where they, as a result of efficient mechanisms of distribution and methods of multilateral organization, has enforced their domination of the black markets. This is especially true in Norway where Lithuanian criminal networks for long have been in control of the mushrooming amphetamine market. Though international networks of drug dealers which specialize in the trade of narcotics consists of people of various nationalities, criminals holding a Lithuanian citizenship are, according to Swedish and Norwegian police, figuring most commonly among those arrested for the involvement in the lucrative drug trade.

In general, synthetic drugs produced in Lithuania, or brought into the country from abroad, are smuggled into the Nordic states either through the usage of the ferry line between Klaipeda and Karlshamn in Sweden, or the Oresund Bridge which connects Denmark and Sweden. In fact, the opening of the Oresund Bridge in 2000 has been a blessing in the eyes of many smugglers, as it provided a relatively safe and direct transport route to the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish markets.

Finnish authorities have even estimated that the majority of amphetamine and synthetic drugs which reach the country from neighbouring Estonia have found its way to Finland through the Oresund Bridge. This definitely underlines the importance of the bridge for international networks of smugglers considering the proximity of Estonia to Finland, and the frequent ferry traffic between the two states.

According to Swedish media sources, cheap Lithuanian methamphetamine has been “over-flooding” the country, and “criminal networks of Lithuanian origin” are slowly gaining a grip on the Swedish black market for synthetic drugs. Sweden is, however, merely a transit country for Lithuanian amphetamine, while the destination for the vast share of the drugs is Norway. 

As has already been alluded to, during the last couple of years, criminal networks, dominated by people with Lithuanian citizenship, has been in firm control of the Norwegian black market for synthetic drugs. Though indeed perceived as a source of grave concern, some Norwegian criminologists suggest that there are some benevolent aspects of the problem. The influx of cheap Lithuanian amphetamine on the Norwegian market has, they argue, contributed to the steady decline of heroine consumption. This development has been a highly prioritized goal for the Norwegian government as the death rate associated with the consumption of illicit drugs, as late as in 2003, was higher in Norway than in any other European state. 

Norway is today the most popular destination among the Nordic countries for Lithuanian emigrants. This has made an imprint insofar as Norwegians, I would argue, are the only one’s among the Nordic nations who, to a greater or lesser extent, has constructed distinct stereotypes about Lithuanians. What is more, although Norwegians in general seem to be well aware of and concerned about the involvement of Lithuanian immigrants in the illicit drug market, Lithuanians are nevertheless infrequently labelled as petty “Eastern European thugs”, which by and large has been the case with, for example, Poles and Romanians.

A Norwegian survey conducted in 2009 showed that Lithuanians, above everything else, were valued for their work in the field of construction and renovation. The same survey indicated that Lithuanians were included in the group of immigrants viewed with most approbation and held as most industrious by Norwegian people themselves.

I remember discussing this issue with a Norwegian friend of mine whom, in a well-intended but yet slightly xenophobic fashion, voiced his opinion on the matter: “There is of course some bad seeds among them, but I have to admit that they know their way around a hammer and a screwdriver.”

What is interesting here, then, is not that Lithuanian immigrants often are associated with construction work or similar blue-collar labour. After all, this does not deviate from the general West European line, made symbolic by the infamous stereotype about the Polish plumber, in which Eastern European labour migrants, at the very best, are perceived to fill the voids left by an increasingly educated domestic labour force in the field of heavy industry and regular blue-collar work. Instead, what seems striking is that Lithuanian labour migrants, despite the blatant prevalence of a stereotypical antithesis (that of the drug dealer), somehow has manage to establish a fairly descent reputation for themselves.

This image of Lithuanians, which is showing signs of increased complexity and stereotypical oscillation, does sharply contrast to the nascent understanding and interest about Lithuania and Lithuanians in the neighbouring Nordic countries. This is, naturally enough, not because Norwegians are more inclined to embrace labour immigrants than other Nordic states, nor do their laws and policies on immigration suggest anything radical; there is simply proportionally more Lithuanians residing in Norway than in any other Nordic state.

However, as far as labour immigration and construction work goes, the role played by Lithuanians in Norway has, as is the case in Western Europe in general, to a great extent been filled by Poles in the surrounding Nordic states. And, as when the Norwegian survey indicates that Norwegians appreciates the work being done by Lithuanian immigrants in the field of construction, Swedes are more likely to declare that their sole reason for hiring Polish labour has to do with the issue of money. In fact, a recently published study shows that one-third of the respondents would refrain from going ahead with a desired renovation project if they had to rely purely on Polish labour. Norwegians, on the other hand, are, according to the survey quoted above, most resentful against Romanians who frequently are associated with unorganized and petty crimes.

Analyzing and explaining for this intricate web of condescending attitudes and stereotypes about Eastern European immigrants, whether it is put in a regional or national context, seems to be an impossible project, especially since many of the prejudices, irregardless of what sort of attitudes they express, underlying these ideas are based on idiosyncratic and irrational assumptions. Nevertheless, the example of how the presence and practices of Lithuanian drug dealers and construction workers in Norway actually have contributed to develop stereotypes, spurred by immigration and social interaction, about the immigrating nation demonstrates that prejudices can be variable and indeed malleable.       

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations. 

During the conversation, Minister A.Ažubalis stressed the advantage of the European Economic Area (EEA) and Norwegian Financial Mechanism that functioned successfully in Lithuania for the period 2004-2009. The Minister expressed trust that a similar agreement would be signed for the period 2009-2014.

“Norwegian Grants 2004-2009 were very popular in Lithuania. The number of applications was twice as big as the amount available for Lithuania. These projects are important to us not only economically, as they also strengthen the relations between Lithuania and Norway,” the head of Lithuania’s diplomacy said.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister thanked J.G.Støre for the support of Norway to the European Humanities University based in Vilnius, and asked for continuous Norway’s support to  this University.

Ministers A.Ažubalis and J.G.Støre discussed bilateral trade and decided that the Lithuanian-Norwegian economic relations could be intensified even more in the future. The Ministers agreed that it would be efficient to organize information campaigns and to use high-level bilateral visits for holding business missions.

In 2009, the Norwegian and Lithuanian trade turnover amounted to 1.233 billion Litas. The trade balance was positive and reached 803 million Litas. Lithuanian exports to Norway in 2009 amounted to 1.018 billion Litas, and imports reached 215.69 million Litas.

The Ministers also discussed the Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Minister A.Ažubalis suggested considering to launch a group of wise men, which would be comprised of representatives from eight countries (NB8). This group would set further Nordic-Baltic cooperation guidelines on common identity, foreign policy, energy, environmentally friendly technologies, etc.

“The Nordic-Baltic cooperation needs to find fresh inspiration and ideas to become more effective,” Minister A.Ažubalis said.

The Ministers discussed Lithuania’s Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), prospects for the organization’s activities in the future, Lithuania’s preparations to chair the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2011. The Ministers discussed ways to make the OSCE activities more effective and the OSCE-anchored dialogue on the future of European security (the Corfu Process).

Minister A.Ažubalis conveyed an invitation to the Norwegian Prime Minister to attend the Summit of the Baltic Sea States due on 1-2 June in Vilnius.

Lithuania holds the Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States since July 2009. In June 2010, Norway will take over the Presidency from Lithuania.

The Ministers discussed preparations for the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on 22-23 April in Tallinn, and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The ministers agreed that NATO had to remain an effective transatlantic defence organization.

During the conversation, the Ministers agreed to decide in the short run on the date of J.G.Støre’s visit to Lithuania.

Press release, Ministry of Foreign Affair of Lithuania

Accordingly, it is frequently asserted that an Estonian gets angry three days after being told an insulting joke, has a hangover three days after drinking, gets an erection three days after looking at a pornographic magazine, and ejaculates three days after having sex. 

One may question why Lithuanian ethnic butts do not target Russians rather than Estonians, considering decades of cultural patronage and the animosity inherited from the Soviet era. The main reason for this is that a vast bulk of those jokes denigrating Estonians actually is of Russian origin. In fact, many of the jokes has only been targeting Estonians when retold and interpreted by their Latvian and Lithuanian neighbours, while they originally were just as likely to be aimed to ridicule Finns. Moreover, those studies being made on modern Russian jokelore reveals that ethnic butts are far more common to address Estonians and Finns than Latvians or Lithuanians.

However, an evident reason for this is that Russians in general have a quite blurry understanding of the Baltic States and tend to confuse their ethnic, cultural and linguistic markers. For example: “Estonians finally translated the fairytale ‘Peter Pan’ – in it they have named him ‘Питарас Пенис’ (Pitaras Penis).”

It is interesting to compare these ample sources of ethnic butts from the Baltic States with their Nordic counterparts, especially so since the majority of Baltic jokes targets a specific ethnic character: the Estonians. It would seem logical that the Swedes would play the far from enviable part as the Nordic equivalent to Estonians, having in mind the size of the population and that the country for long constituted the dominant economic power in the region. However, this is only true to a lesser extent, although the Swedes indeed are the main target in the majority of Nordic jokes in general and in the Norwegian one’s in particular.

The scale of how Swedes and Norwegians have constructed and utilized jokes about each other is largely unparalleled in Europe. This practice of denigrating each others national characters in the form of humorous anecdotes, albeit conducted in a friendly fashion, actually ensued in a virtual war in the early 1970s, widely refereed to as “vitsekriget” (the war of wits), which was fought out on the pages of the popular press. Although a symbolic truce was negotiated by the most prominent figures in this debate already in 1975, jokes about the inconceivably slow nature of the neighbour are still widespread and indeed very popular among both Swedish and Norwegian children today.

In similarity with those Baltic jokes targeting Estonians, Swedish and Norwegian ethnic butts are generally succinct and to the point, and accuses the counterpart of being unnaturally “slow”, without resorting to express blatantly xenophobic opinions: “What is the difference between Norwegians and outer space? We still have hope about finding intelligent life in outer space.”

However, if an Estonian equivalent exist in Nordic jokelore it should be the Finns, whom frequently are made fun of for their alleged asocial behaviour and deep-rooted drunkenness by their Nordic neighbours: “A Norwegian, Swede, Dane and a Finn were transported to a deserted Island as a part of a physiological/sociological experiment. After a year the scientists return. As they approach the Island, the Norwegian was fishing, the Swede had established a government, the Dane had established a farm… and the Finn was still drunk.”

The Finns have, however, not been showing any signs of resentment against their neighbours’ malicious verbal attacks on their nation and culture, but, on the contrary, actively cultivated the mythmaking of themselves as reserved and introvert heavy drinkers. As such, many Finns take great pride in being described in this fashion, and even perceive these attributes as precious national trademarks which separates them from their Nordic neighbours; important enough for a nation that have fought hard for its independence and not had the opportunity to enjoy it for very long.

The self-ironic Finns, then, possess an unparalleled ability to laugh at the jokes being told at their expense. Their Baltic counterpart is without a doubt the Latvians, whose relatively dark humour generally targets the perceived weaknesses and historical atrocities of their own nation. For Latvians, some anthropologists argue, ridiculing the thoughts and acts of those generations, which grew up under totalitarian rule functions as a form of national therapy.

Though Lithuanians and Latvians have been fairly innovative in finding ways of making fun of their Estonian neighbours’ alleged slowness, you rarely hear them accuse the Estonians for being a nation of drunks. Instead, although both the Baltic peoples and the Finns are known to almost never pass down a drink, the majority of jokes concerning drunkenness nevertheless paint a cohesive picture of the Russians as an intoxicated nation.

What seems distressing, however, having this short exposé of the traditional ethnic jokelore in the Baltic Sea region in mind, is that it barely exist any ethnic jokes about the Baltic nations in the Nordic states and vice-versa. It therefore appears like that the Iron Curtain still cast its shadow over how the people inhabiting both regions view each other. Thus, twenty years of increased cooperation and communication between sovereign states has not left any significant mark in the region’s jokelore.

What this indicates is that social and cultural interaction between the Nordic and Baltic states has been lagging behind political and economic cooperation. Despite efforts to draw these regions closer together, this process, regardless of its success on a purely political level, has been lopsided and failed to engender a proliferation of interregional stereotypes in the public mind, which, in the long-run, could constitute the basis for the construction of new types of ethnic jokes. Stereotypes, then, are essential in bridging differences as it shows that one are aware of and not totally indifferent towards one’s neighbour. 

Positive and negative stereotypes about the Nordic states do exist, albeit in an embryonic form, in the Baltic States. These suggest that Baltic people, although regularly admirers of the Nordic well-fare model, tend to perceive their Nordic neighbours as reserved, silent and even cold.

On the other side of the Baltic Sea, however, stereotypes about the Baltic nations hardly exists at all, and the peoples inhabiting these countries are, by and large, viewed as peripheral at best, and with indifference at worst. Though ethnic jokes targeting the Baltic peoples are prevalent, these are frequently outright xenophobic and just as often told about Russians and Poles as well. For example, a so-called urban legend, which has been popular for well over a decade, concerns the Scandinavian man who gets his car stolen in Stockholm or Copenhagen. Subsequently, when on vacation in Estonia, he finds his car parked on a backstreet in Tallinn with the original number plates still attached.

One might disagree and argue that the cross-border cultivation of ethnic and cultural stereotypes only would result in tendencies of increased animosity and regional polarization. However, before making such an assumption, one should reflect on this popular Swedish joke: “Why will there be a war between Sweden and Norway in about 1000 years from now? Because then they will finally understand our jokes about them.” 

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.