Domestic politics of Poland is slowly resuming its usual course, with bitter bickering replacing a brief period of rather respectful intercourse. In terms of foreign policy, the election of B. Komorowski will almost certainly mean less internal discord in Polish foreign policymaking. Earlier, the Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the late President Lech Kaczynski were rivals in this field and had diverging views on how to deal with, for instance, Germany or Russia. Tusk’s pragmatic streak and liberal instincts were constantly at odds with Kaczynski’s conservatism, suspiciousness and self-anointed role of a bulwark against perceived assertiveness of Poland’s historical enemies. Even representing Poland in the EU summits was an issue of competition between the two top officials.

Bronislaw Komorowski is loyal to his party and party’s leader Donald Tusk. Unless he decides to break out of Tusk’s shadow and forge his own identity in foreign policy, where president’s authority is more substantial than in domestic affairs, there is little chance he will diverge from, let alone oppose, Prime Minister’s line. And that line is utterly pragmatic. It is aimed at, first, maintaining good working relations with and constructively engaging three critical players – Washington, Moscow and Berlin (a rather traditional geopolitical triangle in Polish history, where Washington replaced London and Paris) and, second, building and exploiting Poland’s potential as a regional heavyweight, with concomitant influence in the EU and beyond.

When it comes to small Poland’s neighbours or regional partners and their interests or concerns, a certain pattern has already emerged in Poland’s foreign policy which has been noted by many observers: these countries are often treated as a nuisance that occasionally has to be dealt with, but not of any major importance. They are consequential only in so far as building coalitions on various issues pertaining to advancing Poland’s position within the EU are concerned. Noting this egocentric and somewhat arrogant stance, one Polish analyst even went as far as to compare Tusk’s attitude with Putin’s view of the small neighbours. As a result, for instance, the Baltic states are likely to continue having difficulties in enthusing Warsaw to do more for creating or improving crucial energy and transport links between our region and the rest of Europe.

In a similar vein, the cause of promoting democratisation of the space between Russia and the EU is not resonating very well through the pragmatic Warsaw’s foreign policy camp. Or, at least, it has been acquiring a much lower profile. So, with the Kaczynskis out of the picture, transition to post-idealist phase of foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics is almost complete. Estonia’s President Ilves will often feel lonely in this field when meeting his regional counterparts. Values-driven approach to foreign policy, promoted by such figures as Lech Kaczynski of Poland and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania and aimed at bolstering young democracies in Ukraine or Georgia as well as resisting the assertiveness of authoritarian Russia, is unlikely to experience rejuvenation because of Komorowski’s inauguration.

Indeed, the region’s “managerial” prime ministers with their portfolios full of economic interests, infrastructure projects, energy security designs or financial stability issues will have more of a say and will feature more prominently in foreign policymaking than visionary but largely ceremonial presidents – many of whom, including Komorowski, will simply sit in the shadow of their prime ministers. But here we will still have to watch Warsaw as a crucial dealmaker or breaker around which a small interests-based coalition might eventually emerge as a regional group to deal with Berlin, Moscow or Washington on various strategic issues. Poland definitely has all the potential to become the region’s major hub and leader.

One major obstacle to this role is Poland’s aforementioned attitude to smaller neighbours. Lithuanian analysts and commentators pinned some hopes on Komorowski to change that. His ancestry goes back to the aristocratic family that has lived for centuries in the north of Lithuania – a background with which he seems to be emotionally very much connected. There is a certain expectation among Poland-watchers that, originating from a small country, President Komorowski might be more willing and able to listen to them, and that Poland might become more attentive not only to the American, German or Russian voices but also to those of the smaller neighbours and partners. This might indeed become a distinct contribution of President Komorowski to Poland’s pragmatic foreign policy. If he manages to temper Poland’s foreign policy instinct to deal mainly with the “big boys” while giving a cold shoulder to the small ones, he will be remembered fondly in our region.

By Tomas Jermalavicius on 09.08.2010

Russia is arguably the only country in the post-Soviet space where the veneration for Karlsonas has taken on greater proportions than in Lithuania. There has even been estimated that Astrid Lindgren’s Karlsson-on-the-roof is likely to be the second most common book to be found in the average Russian home next to the Bible. (When Astrid Lindgren herself was told about this by the Russian Ambassador to Sweden, Boris Pankin, she is quoted to have said: “Strange, I had no idea that the Bible was that popular”. And when Ingvar Carlsson, then Swedish Minister of State, visited Russia in the early 1990s, his Russian hosts deplored the fact that he had very little in common with “the real Karlsson”.

However, in Sweden, the homeland of Astrid Lindgren and her vast collection of beloved fairytale characters, children barely rank Karlsonas among the top-ten of Astrid Lindgren’s most appreciated figures. Similar attitudes can be observed among Western European children in general, who are more inclined to embrace the stories about Pippi Longstocking and Emil of Lönneberga.

So, does this imply that the frame of cultural preference varies significantly between Eastern European children as compared to Western European children as far as Astrid Lindgren’s stories are concerned?

No, this is not likely to be the case since the image of Karlsson-on-the-roof which has been conveyed in Lithuania and the post-Soviet space is slightly different in several perspectives compared to how he was depicted in the original Swedish versions of the popular books.

What first should be noted is the fairly haphazard translation of the book from Swedish into Russian (and latter from Russian into Lithuanian) which made the objects and the surroundings in the story appear distinctively Soviet, and thus less reminiscent of bourgeois mid-century Stockholm. Of greater importance is that that the Soviet censorship was contemplating the attitude that Karlsonas communicated – individualism, egocentrism, narcissism and anti-authoritarianism – as potentially dangerous and contradictive to the ideological tenants of official discourse. Consequently, in accordance with the stringent demands from the censors, the ensuing story about Karlsonas that was engineered deliberately saw to reduce the most conspicuous acts and elements of crudeness and delinquent behaviour.

The result, however, seems to have been an equally mischievous and innovative Karlsonas, only less wicked and more warm-hearted, who have managed to surpass the original figure’s capacity to strike a cord with generations of children. This is also the Karlsonas one encounter in the cartoons from 1968 and 1971, artfully illustrated by the famous Boris Stepantsev, which is another reason for his immense popularity in the former Soviet Union.

There are, at any case, more connections between the Baltic States and the world of Astrid Lindgren. Generations of Scandinavian children has, for example, enjoyed the pastoral and idyllic illustrations in Astrid Lindgren’s books with a sense of recognition as the surroundings are reminiscent of the typical rural landscape found in the Scandinavian countryside. However, Ilon Wikland, who contributed with the popular illustrations of many of Astrid Lindgren’s most beloved characters, had her childhood Estonia rather than the Scandinavian countryside in mind when she created images to Lindgren’s texts. Consequently, though Wikland was forced to flee Estonia for Sweden during the World War, her Estonian legacy still lives on in many of Lindgren’s books. In addition, in 2009 Wikland was dedicated her own museum in Hapsal, a small Estonian city to the south of Tallinn.

Karlsonas, then, is actually neither Swedish nor Baltic, but Ilon Wikland found the inspiration to draw him as he is normally illustrated, in books and cartoons alike, when she stumbled upon a chubby, red-haired little man at a market in Paris.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.Other articles by Fredrik Rydström

The Belarus connectionEurovision Song Contest and European integration

Eco-efficiency and ketchup on pizza

Lithuania’s white gold

Teachers and pupils; LGBT, Lithuania and Nordics

BaltoScandia:to have (or not) a laugh at the expense of your neighbours

It is impossible not to see that during the recent 10-15 years NATO has changed significantly. In principle, management of international crises has become one of the key NATO‘s function, instead of assuring collective security to the EU Member States. The Baltic States are concerned about that, as well as about NATO‘s ability to make solutions related to collective defense (if, for instance, one of the Baltic states becomes a victim of the military aggression).

The Alliance took the fears of the Baltic States into account: this year NATO anticipates to prepare defense plans for the Baltic States and to organize the first military exercise in their territory.  However, alongside the debates regarding a new strategic concept of NATO, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia raise the issue concerning the concept of „armed aggression“ stipulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  The Baltic States are worried that „armed aggression“ might not include the cyber attacks, information war, blockade of supply of energy resources and similar dangers.

Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the trust in the EU’s ability to struggle against the external threats in the future, although it did not anticipate the establishment of Europe‘s army. The Treaty introduced the obligation of collective defense committing Member States to provide support („by all available measures“) to a state which has become victim of aggression. One of the new issues in the Lisbon Treaty might be “permanent structural cooperation“ stipulating a possibility for a group of EU Member States to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Maybe then EU actions will become more effective in the above sphere. Pursuant to the new clause on „strengthened cooperation“, the EU Council could commit certain countries to take the initiative and protect basic EU values on behalf of the EU.

The ambition „to be where decisions are made“  makes Baltic States to give more attention to CSDP. Maybe it is worth while changing the venue of decision-making from the NATO Council to the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS), moreover that the Lisbon Treaty stipulates more powers to the EC regarding CSDP. Several years ago the Baltic States suspected that France and Germany sought to create a „club“ in the sphere of security and defense for making key solutions without “slowly moving” EU Member States. The Lisbon Treaty legalized formation of the above groupings, but at the same time created conditions for regulation of the process. Therefore, today quite a lot depends on our diplomats‘ ability to negotiate more favorable conditions for joining „strengthened cooperation”, and to specify the commitments of collective defense.

Surely, some EU Member States might pursue the development of a “two-speed” CSDP. Therefore, by supporting the idea of „One Voice Europe“, the Baltic States are not less concerned about what this „one voice“ would say.  The Baltic States will not be able to influence this voice until they are not able to coordinate their actions and expand cooperation with other small EU Member States. In search for partners in Northern Europe, we must not forget the Vyshegrad Group (V4); its experience and interests are similar to ours and V4 seeks to overcome similar fears. Thus, if Baltic States and the Vyshegrad Group countries are able to find a compromise on key CSDP issues, their initiatives and support to specific projects could have major impact on the development of the entire CSDP. However, it is not enough to have a will; it is necessary to take specific actions for coordination and implementation of the common strategy of small Baltic, Northern and Vyshegrad states.

By Dr. Arūnas Molis 2010 06 07

To be sure, although the majority of songs represented may carry the worn-out themes of world peace, eternal love, wild dancing and Hard Rock Hallelujah; Eurovision Song Contest has nevertheless quite frequently been used to convey a more profound political message.

Portugal, the least successful country in the history of the competition, was, for example, following the Carnation revolution in 1974, for several years in a row dedicating their Eurovision entries to lamenting the yoke of fascism and to eulogizing the overthrowing of the regime.    

In a similar vein, when the contest took place in Kiev in 2005 after the victory of Ruslana the previous year in Istanbul, the Ukrainians chose the rather obscure rap-band “Greenjolly” to represent their country. The song paid homage to the newly appointed President, Viktor Yushchenko, and the triumph of the orange revolution. 

Most well-known, however, is perhaps the supposed Georgian entry of 2009 entitled: “We don’t wanna Put In”. Because of its blatant attack on the Russian Prime Minister in the aftermath of the armed conflict in Georgia the summer of 2008, Georgia was expelled from competition that year (they were actually given a choice to change the lyrics but refused).         

The Georgia-Russia crisis is however far from the only regional conflict which has been reflected in the competition. The worst scandal associated with these conflicts occurred in 2009 when the competition definitely left its imprint on the ongoing Ngorno-Karaback conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azeri television was accused of leaving out the Armenian entry in their broadcast while showing another country’s representative instead. Equally distressing was that several of those few Azeri citizens who chose to cast their vote on the Armenian contestant subsequently were paid a visit by the Secret Service. Some of the victims of the contemptible act of government oppression were even interrogated and charged with “unpatriotic behaviour”, and accused of being a threat against national security.

Though the old EU member states has grown increasingly disenchanted with the competition against the backdrop of increasingly poor results and enlargement fatigue, the line of development has, with a few exceptions, been the complete opposite in the majority of post-communist countries and accession states. As for being considered as the periphery of Europe, many of these states views participation in Eurovision Song Contest as an opportunity to open up a window towards Europe, and a chance to share something of themselves on an international arena which is regularly overcrowded or even closed for them. Consequently, scoring a victory in the competition has, time and again, proven to boost confidence and fuel support for Europeanization.

This was certainly the case with Estonia, Latvia and Turkey when they won in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. In the aftermath of the victories top-level politicians in all three countries emphatically declared that they now found themselves on the threshold to Europe and was banging on the door to Brussels. These statements shortly proved to be more than wishful thinking in the case of the former two.

Belarus has arguably been most obsessed among the post-communist states with winning the competition. In fact, the political establishment has stopped close to nothing in order to ensure victory, and it is obvious that the regime is attracted by the international prestige and recognition that follows from organizing the event.   

The conspicuous efforts to promote the country’s representatives have been growing increasingly bizarre over the years, and have so far not been crowned with success. When the competition was held in Moscow in 2009 the Belarusian delegates brought with them huge amounts of various merchandises to be distributed among international journalists, including Belarusian vodka named after their singer, Pjotr Elfimov, which came complete with his picture printed on the bottle. Not everything went according to the plan however. The three tons of ice cream, specially produced for the occasion, melted away shortly after arrival in Moscow as the Belarusian delegation had failed to attain proper freezers and cooling equipment from the Russian organizers.           

Moreover, the accession process in Estonia, which suffered a complete standstill in the beginning of 2001 because of the declining public support for the EU, regained momentum as a result of the unexpected victory in Eurovision Song Contest in 2001. The amount of voters who claimed to be in favour of EU accession was roughly 52 percent in the beginning of 2001, while the tables had turned to such an extent that approximately 64 percent of the population declared that they were going to vote yes in the 2003 referendum in the aftermath of the 2002 Estonian organization of the contest.

What we have seen in recent years is the total transformation of the competition from a fairly nominal Western European music event (notwithstanding the fact that Yugoslavia was represented in the competition since 1961) into an increasingly unwieldy but colourful European integration project. This development has naturally enough not been applauded by everyone, and has gradually become the subject of fierce debates in Western Europe, especially in the wake of the immense successes on behalf of Eastern Europe in the competition during recent years. 

It is interesting to note that the criticism or downright opposition against the enlargement of Eurovision Song Contest, by and large, follows the pattern recognizable from the debate about EU enlargements. Here, too, the large EU states are spearheading the formation of resistance against European expansion. While these states has been able to safeguard their prerogatives within the EU through the voting system which reflects the size of their population, their self-proclaimed role as the overseers of the competition has been guaranteed as the rules stipulate that Spain, Germany, France and the UK are directly qualified to the final together with the previous year’s winner.

This may sound harsh. To be true, although “the big four” in general and the UK in particular are the main proponents of a division of Eurovision Song Contest into one Western and one Eastern European camp, their claims has, time and again, been backed up by those few Western European states which still, by and large, takes the competition seriously; namely Sweden and Belgium. It is, of course, also fairly easy to read too much into the politicization of the event.

However, the parallels between the opposition against an eastward EU-enlargement and the supposed Eastern European domination in Eurovision Song Contest nevertheless show some substantial similarities. Terry Wogan, UKs legendary host, renown for his sarcasm and wittiness, who commented the competition for British broadcasting for 38 years, bitterly asserted prior to Russia’s win in 2008 that: “If we (the UK) don’t do well this time, a new musical iron curtain will fall down past the Danube”.Although Terry Wogan and his followers have presented various explanations for the existence of a conspiracy-like Eastern domination of the competition and reasons to why the alleged Eastern European usurpation of it has to be effectively thwarted, these does mainly fall behind three distinct categories which, taken as a whole, is reminiscent of the critic that has been, and still is, targeted against the EU-enlargement: 
The first argument against the enlargement of the competition is of course that of money. Eurovision Song Contest is today largely financed by “the big four”: Germany, Spain, France and the UK whose generosity has been awarded with a permanent place in the final. Why, then, should economically undeveloped countries in the margin of Europe be allowed to participate when these states, if they would win, hardly have the resources to organize the contest? Why should British and French taxpayers finance a grandiose PR event for a remote country of which they have little or no interest in? However, if it is to any consolations to the poor taxpayers, the greatest share of their money is not earmarked for the organizer itself, but goes to pay of engineers, choreographs and camera men involved in making the competition an eye-catching TV-event. Since the majority of them are from the Nordic states, at least the money stays within Western European pockets.

Then we have the cultural immaturity of the new participants. Some commentators seems to believe that decades of seclusion, when the Eastern European states were firmly looked behind the Iron Curtain, has ensued in a cultural degeneration, and that they therefore lack the capacity to see the beauty and virtue of Western styled music. After all, if one are to judge on the basis of the voting patterns, Eastern Europeans seems fairly indifferent towards the legacy of ABBA, Celine Dion, Domenico Modugno (Volare) and other revered apostles of (Western) European music. Consequently, their common inability to follow in the footprints of the masters should not be considered as nothing short of blasphemy.  

Finally, what has been anathematized by most offended Western Europeans is the alleged bloc-voting apparent in the Central and Eastern Europe region, which, the saying goes, has made it virtually impossible for Western European states to obtain the appreciation they so well deserve. Furthermore, the strong cultural and political bonds between post-communist countries has ensued in that they almost certainly vote for each other, and the cultural powerhouses of the region such as Russia, Ukraine and Turkey in particular, while leaving Western European participants with some mere scrap points.

Sure, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey can usually be found among the top-ten in the final result, and the Slavic post-communist states definitely has some kind of cultural love connection judging from the previous years voting patterns, while Cyprus has awarded Greece the highest point possible since 1996. However, is this really that different from the traditional reflection of national affiliations between Western European states? The bonds between, for example, Ireland and the UK or Sweden and Norway have been proven to be more or less equally strong and perennial throughout the history of the competition.

Indeed, in 2008, Alan Howard, an expert on Human Geography from the University of Reading asserted, after having analyzed tactics and voting patterns from previous years competitions, that: “In general it seems that culture rather than politics is most important. Countries in Eastern Europe may well share a cultural affinity but in recent years the contest winner has garnered support from both East and West.”  

When Norway won the competition last year most critics were silenced. After all, Norway is firmly located in Western European soil unlike Finland which, when managing to the bring the festival to Helsinki for the first time in Eurovision history in 2006, was characterized as being a Eastern European state with a Western façade. However, this was not enough for the antagonists of enlargement whom, in this years competition, reintroduced jury voting. The reason for this, they explained, was to crack down on bloc-voting. Nevertheless, one can also interpret the change of rules as a strategy employed to circumvent the impact of direct voting, and especially those votes emanating from Central and Eastern European states. At any case, the final result was that Germany became the first of “the big four” to score a victory since 1997. 

This has so far been an exclusive Western European debate and voices from the other side of the “musical Iron Curtian” have been fairly absent. Those who have scolded the alleged omnipotence of Eastern Europe in the competition even found a mascot in the 2008 Irish Eurovision entry Dustin the Turkey, a puppet doll, which deliberately tried to make a mockery of the development. Yet Eastern Europe remained silent. However, this year Lithuania, the only Baltic State that so far has failed to score a victory in the competition, participated with a song that, though highly ironic, managed to touch upon the issue. In their own sarcastic way the Lithuanian entry, InCulto, sang that:  “No Sir we’re not equal no, though we are both from the EU. We build your homes and wash your dishes, keep your hands all soft and clean. But one of these days you’ll realize Eastern Europe is in your genes”. The Lithuanian performance pretty much sums it all up: irony, politics, camp dancing and silvery underwear all in one eye-catching mixture.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.

The law enforcement establishments are enforcing harsh and special measures more and more lighthandedly at the expense of the citizens freedom and earnings.

It does not matter, how big the aid packages are – still it is obvious that actually much more is necessary. The usual rate has become hundreds of billions. For example „The debt of Greece is 300 billion euros“ or „The EU created a 750 billion euro aid fund to save the countries in debt“. And by doing that, at the same time breaking all of the EU laws and not being concerned about the angry resistance of the people. This is modern Europe: in debt, breaking its fundamental laws and not caring about the voters opinion.

What is the answer to every crisis from Europe? More power to Brussels! Under our very eyes the plan, which was secretly their point of taking up the euro, is being implemented – a financial system, which is controlled by a central government.

By the lead of France, with the support of the commission and with the whimpering acceptance of Germany, a decision has been made to create a unitary debt system in Europe. This means that not only the 16 euro zone countries, but all the 27 member countries as well form a unitary till, by which euro is being supported. This means – observe carefully! – that the Estonians as well are going to pay for the possible debts or Greece, Portugal, Spain and maybe Great Britain. Even before we are a member of the euro zone. And they do not need our agreement. The steps are taken with the help of the Lisbon treaty, which is the basis of the United States of Europe, and by the means of majority voting, so no-one would have the right to veto.

But what good does this kind of fund do? Solely the debt of the Mediterranean countries adds up to about 7 trillion euros and it is becoming more and more clearer that these countries are not able to handle their debts due to the budgets being negative all the time. The attempt of handling this kind of debt with 750 billion is as efficient as urinating to a burning house to extinguish it.

Because of the ’life-is-going-to-get-better’ talk the Estonians have given up their independence and they are still demanded a huge ’solidarity’. The brave Estonian saving-government, who managed to cut a dozen billion kroons is a part of Greece-saving (as well as Spain, Portugal and  Italy) fund in the extent of even more. Nobody exactly knows the figures, however 14 to 20 billion kroons have circled in the publicity.

At the same time, USA Senat decided (with 94 votes in favour and 0 against) on preventing the government to give 320 billion dollars through IMF to the Greece’s aid-package. The money from America was virtually the only real money on the table, while the contribution of everyone else was an accounting trick. By what exactly is Germany or Great Britain, whose national debt is close to 80 per cent of GDP, in a better financial position than Greece or Italy, whose debt is about 115 per cent of GDP and growing?

What do all of these numbers actually mean? Well, firstly that euro as a currency is unstable. Wait! Was not the stability supposed to be a great advantage, which we were supposed to get by joining the euro zone? Oh, it does not matter, let us not wind it over the top with these kind of little things as stability. What do these numbers show as well?

For example, that the price of euro as a currency is dropping constantly. That is good, right? I mean for the export, which was supposed to be the big locomotive, which would pull the Estonian economy to full speed once again? Only, the bigger part of our export is going to the euro zone and our currency is strictly tied to euro. So, that brings us nothing. The price of the money is lowering – as well as are our savings and salaries – however, we do not get any real positive effect from it.

This way or the other, the „eurocrats“ do not let a perfectly good crisis go to waste. The project of the supercountry has to go on. Brussels wants that from now on, the governments have to let their budgets be looked at by the „eurocrats“ and be accepet before they reach the government. So that the countries would not spend as much, as has happened in all of the European countries except Estonia.

The creaters of the euro have never hidden their goal: it is not possible to have a common currency if there is no common budget and taxes. The crisis of euro has given the centralisers a new reason to collect taxes and start doing the budgets in Brussels instead of the capitals. How many billion kroons the poor Estonia is going to pay to the richer Western-Europeans in order to pay their debts every year, is not known, however, let us live in the hope that if the people making decisions are ones from Greece/Italy/Spain, not our politicians, the numbers will be modest.

What happens with money in a bankrupt empire, where the doing of the labour has been replaced by redistribution, should be remembered by Estonians quite well. The difference between now and the time of Ruble is yet conceptual: at that time we had no control of the situation and the only way to get out of the money, which brought great poverty was the transition to our money, which we control by ourselves. Now the situation is upside down: we have our money, which we control and which serves us well, however our politicians want to abandon it, to transmute to a money, which burns in every corner an which we cannot control a bit. Insanity!

The euro-enthusiasts confirm us that actually the euro and kroon has no difference, because we are so strictly tied to the rate anyways. That conceptually we have a euro with the picture of Koidula on it. It is so only partly. The country has – broadly speaking – three handles to influence its economy by: the budget, the cashflow and the price of currency. At the moment, Estonia is basically using only the first one – the budget. The price of currency we have tied to euro and for the cashflow we also have set ourselves very strict restrictions, at the same time, giving the Swedish banks a greater roll in it, than the Estonian Bank or the government. Only a dumb person or a euroagent might believe, that this will help our economy or is going to bring about the rise of well-being in Estonia.

It is clear for a thinking person that the euro as a currency is in a deadlock and no effort, aid package, further centralisation, special measure or even saving packages is going to help in the Old Europe. The euro is doomed. The only thing is to wait and see if it will happen through hyperinflation, which will be started by the desperate attept from the European Central Bank to increase the cashflow by printing more bank-notes and by that make more money to pay the countries’ debts or will it collapse through the dropout of a series of countries from the euro zone.

Before the final collapse, we will have the chance to witness the measures usually taken by banana republics, as capital control, price of currency, amount, amount of exchange, restricting certain kind of deals and declearing them speculations, implementing taxes and fees, which equal to confiscating to certain economic activities. These are all signs of the agony of the end. One way or the other, it has failed as a political project (and euro has never been anything else). It is nearly impossible to see, how the EU can last, if the main thing keeping it together and deepening integration has blown sky-high.

On the background of it all, the keenness to euro of the Estonian politicians and people who think they are economists, is unbelievable. Our politicians, economic experts, businessmen and the media should be concern of a question, how to lower all of the risks, what the fast developments in the economy of the world are causing. Beside dreaming of the economic stabilising we should think, how to save the Estonian people the second time in 20 years from total impoverishment. This time, the result depends only on us.

The first and the foremost decision should be the abandoning the transition to euro. One does not plan a wedding with a walking corpse. Even if euro does not collapse before the new year, a serious instability is ahead and a collapse in the upcoming years. In the light of that, the preservation of kroon, strictly tied to euro is a half-measure, which would only give us the opportunity to control the amount of the money afloat, not the price of the currency.

Estonia must look its system of the currency committee and decide, whether to tie its money to some other currency or go over to a floating currency.

Taken in to account that we are one of the lowest public national debt countries in the world (solely 7,2 per cent of GDP), that our currency has a really good cash reserve and that we have gone through deflation, which has increased our competitiveness, the Estonian financial situation is immeasurably better off than euro or the countries behind the euro. By preserving the kroon, our opportunity to export to Europe would not go anywhere – it would improve, because the currency rate of kroon to euro would decrease a bit. The untying of the currency rate would create the opportunity to start controlling the export deficit, which conceptually leads to the exporting of wealth that is created in Estonia.

The Estonian economy is small and if the euro blows sky-high, it will influence us strongly one way or the other. That is the reason, why to give twice the effort in ensuring that we do everything to save us from the worst. The preservation of kroon and untying from the euro is our best defence against the obstacles and difficulty ahead.

[Translated by Jaanus Karlson, original article in Estonia by Martin Helme. Written by: Jaanus Karlson

Critics within Lithuania note that while there is justification for sending its troops to Afghanistan to deny those who harbored the fanatics responsible for 9/11 a return to power, support for the Bush administration’s ill considered invasion of Iraq was unjustified. Furthermore, while Lithuania’s commitment to expanding the zone of democracy in the former Soviet space is a noble undertaking, does such an ambitious enterprise make sense given its domestic problems and foreign policy challenges?  Of course, it must adhere to its principles but it must also acknowledge its vulnerabilities and proceed with caution. As every freshman university student knows: “politics is the art of the possible.” What is more, democracy cannot be exported; it must evolve out of a country’s history, culture and current political matrix.

There is, of course, a simple retort to those who criticize Lithuania for embracing the American narrative of what is best for Eastern and Central Europe. How could Lithuania refuse any request for help from the country that has done more than any other one to achieve its foreign policy priorities: for example, making NATO membership possible and encouraging Brussels to open the EU’s door to it as well? How could it refuse any request from the U.S. that alone possesses the military might to protect it in event of an attack from the east–no matter how unlikely an armed threat from that quarter may be?

But now the people responsible for the Iraq disaster have left office and their neo-conservative supporters of imprudent American unilateralism have been discredited, so the time has come for Lithuania to adopt policies that do not originate in Washington. It is not a matter, as some fear, that the administration of President Barack Obama is any less supportive of Lithuania than was true of his predecessor. He has indicated categorically that he remains committed to the security of all of NATO’s members. Indeed, his pledge to honor Article 5 should be enhanced by the fact that he has help burnish America’s image in the eyes of the international community. Also at Tallinn, his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pledged that the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing it nuclear weapons from Europe at this time. A policy favored by leaders in Central and Eastern Europe along with most of them in the Western half of the Continent as well.

Meanwhile, Lithuania must look to the EU to help it address its foreign policy challenges; a major question being how to reconcile Lithuanian-Russian friction. Given its size, enormous economic and political power, the EU certainly can provide help on this vital matter. But there is a big question mark here: will the EU operate like a truly united union and confront Russia with a single EU policy on a host of matters vital to Lithuania’s welfare such as energy security? The answer to date is a resounding: “No!”

Indeed, there is disturbing evidence that the larger members of the EU are moving along a path that is marked by bi-lateral and not multi-lateral policies in their dealings with Russia. In the process, they have dismissed expressions of concern on the part of member states that once were part of, or associated with the former Soviet Union. This is curious since the leaders of France and Germany have long complained with justification that their counter-parts in Washington have ignored their interests and have rejected their inputs in matters that profoundly concern them. Yet they are guilty of precisely the same thing when it comes to the smaller members of the EU.

Clearly then it is a major foreign policy goal of Lithuania to secure close and harmonious relations with neighboring states that understand why the Baltic democracies are worried about their vulnerability to those in Moscow who have used Russia’s energy assets to compromise their sovereignty and political influence to isolate them. Poland and the Nordic States fit that category, consequently Lithuania’s leaders have indicated on many occasions that close and harmonious relations with both entities represent a priority for them. But at the same time, many commentators have observed that Lithuanian domestic politics threaten to compromise relations with the Poles and the Nordic countries.

Two days before his plane crashed in Smolensk, Polish president Lech Kasczynski met with his Lithuanian counter-part Dalia Grybauskaite and said that he hoped the dispute over how Polish names were spelled would be resolved. The Polish media had blistered the Lithuanian Seimas for endorsing a law that would proscribe Poles from using characters common to the Polish language that were not found in Lithuanian. The law, its supporters contended, would protect the Lithuanian language from being corrupted by outside influences. Both Grybauskaite and Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius indicated that they also hoped that the Seimas would pass a law with which Lithuanian Poles could live. Kubilius asked: is the Lithuanian language so weak that it cannot allow its Polish citizens to use the names that their parents gave them?

Indeed, one of Lithuania’s most celebrated values over the centuries has been its tolerance for minority peoples living within its borders. At the same time, there is a compelling practical reason for Lithuania to have good relations with a neighbor almost ten times it size; an ally that is likewise a member of the EU and NATO and a country that has been applauded for its successful economic policies and new promising foreign policy initiatives. On this last matter, the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has received high marks for reconciling differences with Germany, and allied observers have expressed hope that a reconciliation of Polish-Russian relations is in the works as well.

The tragic death of the Polish president has created a truly historic prospect: the end of Polish-Russian enmity that has characterized relations between the two peoples for centuries. Even bitter critics of the Kremlin, like The Economist’s Edward Lucas has praised Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for his sincere display of remorse after the president and his entourage crashed in Smolensk. They were on their way to a commemeration of the Katyn forest massacre of 20,000 Polish military personnel at the hands of Stalin’s agents. Foreign commentators expressed amazement after Putin first conceded that the Soviets and not the Nazis were responsible for the massacre, and then agreed to commemorate the evil deed at a ceremony attended by high-level Polish and Russian officials.

It is especially noteworthy that Zbigniew Brzezinski, a man whose name does not bring smiles to the faces of the Kremlin overlords, has joined the chorus of those Western analysts who have had high praise for Putin and sees this expression of harmony between Warsaw and Moscow as a possible huge resetting of relations between these ancient adversaries. “I do not think that this is a game on the part of Russia,” he wrote in Time Magazine, “this is something sincere and very new.” The former national security advisor of President Jimmy Carter and a man with influence in the Obama administration concludes that if this is evidence of reconciliation on the part of Poland and Russia, “it will be geo-politically potentially equal to the importance of German-Polish reconciliation.”

Only time will tell whether this outcome takes place but should it occur it could have huge potentially positive implications for Lithuania’s relations with Moscow. Consequently, it is imperative that any differences between Lithuania and Poland be reconciled.

Turning to close relations with the Nordic States, a recent Swedish graduate of Vilnius University has written a provocative but balanced assessment of a major barrier to those relations. In the English language portal, the Lithuanian Tribune, Fredrik Rydström has observed that the Nordic countries did not pay much attention to Lithuania until the summer of 2009, “when information about the ‘law on the protection of minors’ first hit the newsstands. Thus Lithuania went from being perceived of as a nonentity to a nation of homophobes virtually overnight. Consequently, despite all efforts to promote a positive image of Lithuania abroad, what finally has struck is the conceptualization of a nation which strives to institutionalize homophobia.”

These are tough words and Rydström warns Scandinavian critics to be careful not to be self-righteous in their criticism of Lithuania. In his experience, most Lithuanians do not dwell on homosexuality and it is irresponsible for foreign commentators to exaggerate its importance to them. But he himself strikes a further blow when he makes the following observation. “…when Lithuanian authorities assert that Lithuania has its own values as opposed to those espoused by the EU, the phraseology is not without importance. This is the case since there is another country in Europe which recurrently has invoked similar explanations when trying to justify its circumvention or sheer neglect of human rights, namely Russia.”

In its quest to join the EU and NATO, Lithuania has pledged to embrace the democratic values of both organizations. Without dismissing real concerns that a small country like Lithuania has about the sanctity of its language and values, it is clear that it must honor that pledge. The truth is that in today’s world, there cannot be a dramatic disconnect between a country’s domestic practices and its international commitments.

Dick Krickus is professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington and has held the H. L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University.

In mid-March, narcissuses, crocuses, and tulips are in full bloom in Belgium. You can find these flowers everywhere: in Brussels and in the cozy suburbs surrounding the city, such as Ukkel (where the Russian Embassy, a beautiful building and a pond, is located). Russia’s envoy to NATO Dmitriy Rogozhin hosted the Ekspress Nedelia journalist in the luxurious foyer of the embassy.

(Ekspress Nedelia) I would first like to explain to the readers what the Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO is doing and the difference between the mission and the Russian Embassy in Belgium, which is located in the same building. I also would like to explain to the readers the difference between your work and the work of the “ordinary” diplomats in Brussels.

(Rogozin) Perhaps only the divers – or to be more exact the divers who can go down some 50 meters or more, where the ocean is full of sharks and other sea beasts, and to be even more exact, the divers who can do all that without the aqualung – could understand the difference. I used to participate in the underwater sports and I know what I am talking about. So, we can say that the Russian Permanent Mission to NATO is a group of Russian diplomats and military officers placed in the predatory environment. We are a group of 37. This is a big group of people, but we work in several buildings, not just in the embassy, but also in the NATO headquarters in Brussels and in the NATO Military Command in Mons.

Our work is based on the activities of the working groups, which, in a way, reflects the structures that exist in NATO. Moreover, there is the Russia-NATO Council, which organizes summits of the presidents, the heads of the Foreign or Defence Ministries, or the commanders of the Defence Headquarters at least twice a year… We spend the rest of the time having meetings at the ambassadorial level and the level of steering committees.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What about your status? Do the people call you “Your Excellence,” just as they do the Russian ambassador to Belgium?

(Rogozin) Well, they do call me “Your Excellency.”

(Ekspress Nedelia) Do you have an aide-de-camp?

(Rogozin) I have an aide-de-camp, a BMW, and a Ducati, if you are interested in such things. I have all that.

(Ekspress Nedelia) If it is not a secret, are you paid less than the Russian ambassador to Belgium?

(Rogozin) The amount of my salary is established by the Russian Government, which has set up the Russian Permanent Mission to NATO. I have the same salary as the Russian ambassador to Belgium, and the chief military adviser earns 95 per cent of the ambassador’s salary, paid in euro.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What are the specifics of your work?

(Rogozin) I find it difficult to relate myself to diplomats, because I came from politics.

(Ekspress Nedelia) And you came to politics from journalism!

(Rogozin) There are diplomats who think that the art of diplomacy is not to reveal your thoughts. Unlike diplomats, politicians are seeking to express their thoughts clearly and concisely. Considering the delicate balance in the relations between Russia and NATO, the diplomats have to work with public opinion issues, besides working with each other. There is a difference between our work and the work of the Permanent Missions to the UN or the EU, the Permanent Mission to NATO deals with issues that have to do with war and peace…

(Ekspress Nedelia) You have once said that Russian diplomacy has to be like an iron fist in a soft kid glove.

(Rogozin) Or like a wise head in a strong helmet.

(Ekspress Nedelia) In your opinion, is NATO an aggressive organization?

(Rogozin) It is a military-political organization.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Does it pose any threat to Russia?

(Rogozin) If you have in mind the NATO troops deployed near the border with Russia, they do not pose any threat, because it is obvious that the number of such troops is not sufficient to be seen as a threat. On the other hand, there is a certain discomfort. Believe me, I feel genuinely hurt when people are playing the game of war! Everybody understands that Russia does not pose any threat. And we feel a certain degree of discomfort when we see that somebody is acting childish and irresponsible.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Perhaps Russia could join NATO? NATO leaders have mentioned such a possibility: Robertson was the first to mention the idea; then Ruhe, former defence minister of the Federal Republic of Germany; then it was Naumann, former head of the NATO Military Planning Committee; and finally the current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and US State Secretary Hillary Clinton.

(Rogozin) I can rephrase your question: Perhaps NATO could join Russia? On a serious note, I do not understand how the people can part with something very precious to them. I have in mind the sovereignty of a country, the country’s right to be in charge of its own armed forces and the right to have its own foreign policy.

(Ekspress Nedelia) This summer, NATO will conduct a large-scale military training in the Baltic countries. NATO’s “hawks” are saying that this is a response to “Russia’s aggressive ambitions in this region.” What can you say about these military manoeuvres?

(Rogozin) This is absurd. On the other hand, I must say I am genuinely happy for the prostitutes living in Klaipeda. They perhaps would be the only ones who will benefit directly from the disembarkation of the US Marine Corps in this Lithuanian city.

(Ekspress Nedelia) May I quote your words?

(Rogozin) You are welcome to do that!

(Ekspress Nedelia) What can you say about the recent NATO military exercise in the Baltic skies? If I am correct, you promised $1 million to anybody who proves that the manoeuvres, in which the potential adversary was “some Eastern land,” were not directed against Russia?

(Rogozin) I am sure NATO did not mean that the manoeuvres were organized to act against the aggressive plans of Iran. I am stunned. It ridiculous to think that the two L-39 fighter planes Lithuania has, (which are actually training aircraft), or the two tanks Estonia and Latvia have, could pose any threat to the security or the sovereignty of Russia. But what really worries us is the fact that the NATO military structure, and  even more so the US military structure, is drawing closer to our borders, for example the Patriot missiles in Poland.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What is your take on the current Russia-NATO relations? What can you say about the reassurance of the NATO leaders who are saying that NATO does not pose any threat to Russia? And what can you say about the statements by some Baltic politicians that Russia poses a threat to the Baltic countries?

(Rogozin) The relations between Russia and NATO are like “an average temperature in a hospital.” For example, there are partners who do not want our relations to deteriorate and speak in favour of mutual understanding in strategic issues. And there are countries that see nightmares in the sleep that the Russians are coming to their countries, and they wet their beds in sleep. We should remember that NATO is a group of 28 countries, and that what NATO Secretary General Rasmussen is saying is an average (consensus) opinion. The same goes for NATO foreign policy; it is also an average of foreign policies of all the NATO members.

(Ekspress Nedelia) It is noteworthy that Georgian President Saakashvili shares the fears of some of the Baltic politicians. We all remember the television show broadcast by the Imedi television station, which scared the wits out of many residents of Georgia and even of many European officials. Even EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso spoke at the joint conference with Georgian Prime Minister Gilauri, urging “to drop any activities that could lead to a political tension on the local and the regional levels.”

(Rogozin) No comments. Mr Saakashvili is a “sick person” whom we cannot help.

(Ekspress Nedelia) But do you think there is any possibility that the “sick person” will get well and will “mature” enough to become a NATO member?

(Rogozin) Who? Saakashvili?

(Ekspress Nedelia) No, I have in mind Georgia.

(Rogozin)I do not think so. But this is my personal opinion.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What about the United States? This country plays the leading role in NATO.

(Rogozin)Indeed, the United States plays a big role in NATO, but this role is not the decisive one. To explain this to you in business terms, the United States has the “blocking stake” in NATO, but certainly not the “controlling stake.” Even though the United States could carry out its own policy in NATO, it prefers to share the responsibility or to burden others with the responsibility. Generally speaking, NATO’s intention is collective responsibility for the decisions.

(Ekspress Nedelia) In your opinion, what role does Lithuania play in NATO? Judging by the continuous declarations made by some Lithuanian politicians and the verbal attacks on Russia, Vilnius is playing an important role in NATO.

(Rogozin) I will tell you this: In Soviet times, we saw the people living in the Baltic countries as someone extraordinary. The Baltic countries were in a way a “show window” of the Soviet system. It was a great thing to live in the Baltic countries…. I remember, when I was in the 9th grade, the girl I liked told me that she had a friend living in a Baltic country. She said that to hurt my feelings, because it turned out later on that the friend was only in her imagination…. The situation has changed now. Not long ago, I was coming back from my trip to London and had a chat with a Lithuanian woman at the airport. She was very eager to tell me about her life in the United Kingdom….

(Ekspress Nedelia) In Russian?

(Rogozin)Yes, even though it was very difficult for her.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Did she recognize you? Did she know that she was talking to the Russian envoy to NATO?

(Rogozin )No. Young people are not interest in these things. Coming back to the issue of Lithuania, there are three aspects that we should consider. In Brussels, I have a wonderful and a very constructive relationship with the Lithuanian envoy to NATO Linas Linkevicius.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Who came to diplomacy from politics, and to politics from journalism, just like you?

(Rogozin) I did not know that. Well, we meet, have coffee, and speak about everything openly. On the other hand, Lithuania is one of the “cheerleaders” of various campaigns directed against Russia. And, finally, Lithuania wants to convince everybody that nobody knows Russia better than Lithuania does. But if in the past such strategy worked, now it does not.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Neither Russia, nor even France managed to convince the Lithuanian politicians that the contract for the purchase of the two French assault helicopter ships Mistral does not pose any threat to the peace and stability in the region.

(Rogozin) On the one hand, NATO is saying that the cooperation with Russia should be strengthened, and that the Alliance is highly interested in the acquisition of Russian military equipment, for example the “helicopter set” for the NATO operations in Afghanistan. On the other hand, when we want to buy from our NATO partner two ships, there are problems. This is illogical.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Several years ago, you successfully solved the problem of the Kaliningrad transit, when a perfect solution was found (acceptable to all the parties involved: Russia, Lithuania, and the EU). How serious are the disagreements between Russia and Lithuania as far as military issues are concerned?

(Rogozin) To begin with, there is no military cooperation between Russia and Lithuania. The problem of military transit remains unsolved. And, as you know, NATO is interested in the transit of its military shipments through the Russian territory (3,500 km) to the border with Kazakhstan. And we cannot solve the problem of the transit of our military shipments through the territory that is less than 200 km.

Nevertheless, the prospects for the Russian-Lithuanian relations are positive. All we need is the Lithuanian elite to focus its attention on constructive relations with Russia.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Do you have friends among Lithuanian politicians? With whom would you like to play basketball or tennis?

(Rogozin) Gediminas Kirkilas who came to Brussels last year, when he still was prime minister. I have already mentioned Linas Linkevicius. By the way, basketball is a good idea, we have a good team here and we often play with our partners from NATO countries. The Americans beat us once (there are members of the Naval Force on the team), but we played a very nasty trick on them, something only the Russians are capable of doing, we proposed them several boxes of vodka and Abkhazian wine, and we tied the score after half an hour.

P.S. (from Vladas Liubartas, the journalist): On my way back from Brussels to Vilnius, I was on the same plane as now former Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas. He asked me to give Mr Rogozhin his greetings, and when I mentioned the possible basketball game, he offered to organize it in…Afghanistan.

Paet and Kouchner agreed that good defence-related co-operation exists between Estonia and France and that it should become even closer.

Foreign Minister Urmas Paet thanked his French colleague for the air policing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – starting in January, France is participating in the air policing mission over the Baltic states.

“France is participating in the Baltic air policing mission for the second time already, and we greatly appreciate that,” stated Paet.

While talking about security co-operation, the ministers also addressed the sale of Mistral-type ships to Russia.

Paet confirmed that Estonia has submitted its official application to become the home country for the European Union IT agency for justice, freedom and security.

“We feel it is important to use information technology more effectively than before in the European Union internal security sector, which is why it is necessary to create a separate IT agency. Taking into consideration Estonia’s highly-developed IT sector, we believe that Estonia possesses all the qualifications to be a good location for the agency,” stated the foreign minister. “Establishing the IT agency in Estonia would create useful co-operation opportunities for both us and France regarding the more effective use of information technology in the European Union internal security sector,” Paet added.

The Estonian Foreign Minister said that it is important to adhere to the 2003 decision of the European Council, according to which new European Union agencies should be located in new member states.

Also addressed at the meeting was Estonia’s candidacy to become an observer in the International Organisation of the Francophonie (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie – OIF). Foreign Minister Urmas Paet stated that many cultural points of contact have formed between Estonia and the francophone cultural space.

“Estonia feels it is important for international integration to be as close as possible; this includes contacts with countries in the French cultural space. The International Organisation of the Francophonie subscribes to the same goals that Estonia prioritises in its foreign policy – the promotion of democracy, human rights and freedoms and the assurance of peace and development. Observer status in the International Organisation of the Francophonie would help give additional momentum to cultural exchange and research co-operation with francophone countries,” he said.

The OIF unites 70 nations, including 14 observer states across the globe.

While talking about accession to the euro zone, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet noted that Estonia would like to join the euro zone at the beginning of 2011.

The national defence minister said that she could not say calmly that the Lithuanian armed forces were prepared to defend the country taking into account the present circumstances. “The situation is not the most favourable one, the long-term lack of finance for the national defence system, a lot of propaganda saying that everything is alright and that we have ones of the strongest armed forces in the world have largely affected the national defence system. Add the crisis, cutbacks in finance and we are on the brink of an abyss,” Jukneviciene said.

The minister agreed with the position of Arvydas Anusauskas, head of the Seimas’ National Security and Defence Committee, that the ongoing situation might pose a threat to national security.”There is a lack of money to perform all functions. To compare with other states, Lithuania has the smallest army; there is a question whether we will reduce it even more. Soldiers receive lower pays, but we do not have money to ensure them a possibility of constant training, learning to defend their country,” Jukneviciene said.

The national defence minister noted that Lithuania had to abandon its defence attaches to Great Britain, Germany and France due to cut funding of representation offices, even though their presence was very important for communication with NATO.

According to Jukneviciene, Lithuania might not be able to be an Alliance member due to the constant reduction of funding. The minister emphasised that our country was reproached for that all the time. NATO member states are obliged to allocate 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to national defence. “The Estonians retain the level of 1.8 percent of GDP, Lithuania has dropped to 0.9 percent and approaches 0.8 percent of GDP, which means that soon we will be unable to be NATO members. Our partnership is very important, solidarity is crucial, and if we do not make at least a minimum input to be ready to defend our country, NATO will soon raise a question whether we indeed want to be NATO members,” Jukneviciene warned.

The national defence minister said that she did not ask for additional money to national defence this year. However, the minister stressed that the state budget for next year should foresee that the funding for the national defence system would not be below 1 percent of GDP.

Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius promised to find ways to increase funding. “In the difficult financial situation, it was not very easy to increase funding in any way. Our common goal is to ensure that at least 1 percent of GDP would be reached, though the NATO standard is 2 percent,” Kubilius said.

The ambassador had in mind France’s intentions to sell Mistral warship to Russia.  He said, “I personally think this isn’t a good development. This indicates to an evident difference in how NATO and a member state approach defence policy. NATO sees Russia as a threat, and here we are providing them with defence capabilities”.  The diplomat added, “NATO is open to Russia, meanwhile Russia follows a doctrine of NATO being a threat or danger of sorts”.