Domestic politics of Poland is slowly resuming its usual course, with bitter bickering replacing a brief period of rather respectful intercourse. In terms of foreign policy, the election of B. Komorowski will almost certainly mean less internal discord in Polish foreign policymaking. Earlier, the Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the late President Lech Kaczynski were rivals in this field and had diverging views on how to deal with, for instance, Germany or Russia. Tusk’s pragmatic streak and liberal instincts were constantly at odds with Kaczynski’s conservatism, suspiciousness and self-anointed role of a bulwark against perceived assertiveness of Poland’s historical enemies. Even representing Poland in the EU summits was an issue of competition between the two top officials.

Bronislaw Komorowski is loyal to his party and party’s leader Donald Tusk. Unless he decides to break out of Tusk’s shadow and forge his own identity in foreign policy, where president’s authority is more substantial than in domestic affairs, there is little chance he will diverge from, let alone oppose, Prime Minister’s line. And that line is utterly pragmatic. It is aimed at, first, maintaining good working relations with and constructively engaging three critical players – Washington, Moscow and Berlin (a rather traditional geopolitical triangle in Polish history, where Washington replaced London and Paris) and, second, building and exploiting Poland’s potential as a regional heavyweight, with concomitant influence in the EU and beyond.

When it comes to small Poland’s neighbours or regional partners and their interests or concerns, a certain pattern has already emerged in Poland’s foreign policy which has been noted by many observers: these countries are often treated as a nuisance that occasionally has to be dealt with, but not of any major importance. They are consequential only in so far as building coalitions on various issues pertaining to advancing Poland’s position within the EU are concerned. Noting this egocentric and somewhat arrogant stance, one Polish analyst even went as far as to compare Tusk’s attitude with Putin’s view of the small neighbours. As a result, for instance, the Baltic states are likely to continue having difficulties in enthusing Warsaw to do more for creating or improving crucial energy and transport links between our region and the rest of Europe.

In a similar vein, the cause of promoting democratisation of the space between Russia and the EU is not resonating very well through the pragmatic Warsaw’s foreign policy camp. Or, at least, it has been acquiring a much lower profile. So, with the Kaczynskis out of the picture, transition to post-idealist phase of foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics is almost complete. Estonia’s President Ilves will often feel lonely in this field when meeting his regional counterparts. Values-driven approach to foreign policy, promoted by such figures as Lech Kaczynski of Poland and Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania and aimed at bolstering young democracies in Ukraine or Georgia as well as resisting the assertiveness of authoritarian Russia, is unlikely to experience rejuvenation because of Komorowski’s inauguration.

Indeed, the region’s “managerial” prime ministers with their portfolios full of economic interests, infrastructure projects, energy security designs or financial stability issues will have more of a say and will feature more prominently in foreign policymaking than visionary but largely ceremonial presidents – many of whom, including Komorowski, will simply sit in the shadow of their prime ministers. But here we will still have to watch Warsaw as a crucial dealmaker or breaker around which a small interests-based coalition might eventually emerge as a regional group to deal with Berlin, Moscow or Washington on various strategic issues. Poland definitely has all the potential to become the region’s major hub and leader.

One major obstacle to this role is Poland’s aforementioned attitude to smaller neighbours. Lithuanian analysts and commentators pinned some hopes on Komorowski to change that. His ancestry goes back to the aristocratic family that has lived for centuries in the north of Lithuania – a background with which he seems to be emotionally very much connected. There is a certain expectation among Poland-watchers that, originating from a small country, President Komorowski might be more willing and able to listen to them, and that Poland might become more attentive not only to the American, German or Russian voices but also to those of the smaller neighbours and partners. This might indeed become a distinct contribution of President Komorowski to Poland’s pragmatic foreign policy. If he manages to temper Poland’s foreign policy instinct to deal mainly with the “big boys” while giving a cold shoulder to the small ones, he will be remembered fondly in our region.

By Tomas Jermalavicius on 09.08.2010

The only new thing here was perhaps bluntness and an attempt to provoke and challenge the old rival – the United States. It was the Americans who taught us how “to compete in politics. We can pressure and we will pressure” (Zlobin).

This was obviously demonstrated in Georgia, Ukraine, perhaps in Kyrgyzstan now. Zlobin thinks that Putin’s aggressive policy of “national egoism” is supported by senior US officials. Allegedly, the Americans hold the same view: “If you respect the interests of neighbouring countries, you betray the interests of your own country.” Therefore, they will be favourable towards Putin, the “defender” of Russia. Dmitriy Medvedev travelled to check this.

The statement about neighbours as an eternal problem may seem frightening. Usually, however, there is talk about coordination of interests. Now, this sounds like the law of the fist, like the return of the Tsar era. After all, some time ago they justified the purchase of Mistral with the need to frighten Japan! Over there Russia occupies additional four of the Kuril Islands, which the neighbouring country hopes to regain through negotiations. The only response to such aggressive intentions can be the fist that always and everywhere defends the Russian interests without any negotiations. And without peace accords, an eternal war.

The question remains before the United States. Is this really an “American” policy of Russia, which the United States finds appealing? If the challenge is ignored, it may seem so. Will, however, the big democratic country respond to the Moscow official, who tries to provoke it in a strange way? Those specialists know how to do it so that they score a propaganda victory either way. Look, we threw it at them, and they swallowed it.

the text was published www.bernardinai.lt on 24 June

It is impossible not to see that during the recent 10-15 years NATO has changed significantly. In principle, management of international crises has become one of the key NATO‘s function, instead of assuring collective security to the EU Member States. The Baltic States are concerned about that, as well as about NATO‘s ability to make solutions related to collective defense (if, for instance, one of the Baltic states becomes a victim of the military aggression).

The Alliance took the fears of the Baltic States into account: this year NATO anticipates to prepare defense plans for the Baltic States and to organize the first military exercise in their territory.  However, alongside the debates regarding a new strategic concept of NATO, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia raise the issue concerning the concept of „armed aggression“ stipulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.  The Baltic States are worried that „armed aggression“ might not include the cyber attacks, information war, blockade of supply of energy resources and similar dangers.

Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the trust in the EU’s ability to struggle against the external threats in the future, although it did not anticipate the establishment of Europe‘s army. The Treaty introduced the obligation of collective defense committing Member States to provide support („by all available measures“) to a state which has become victim of aggression. One of the new issues in the Lisbon Treaty might be “permanent structural cooperation“ stipulating a possibility for a group of EU Member States to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Maybe then EU actions will become more effective in the above sphere. Pursuant to the new clause on „strengthened cooperation“, the EU Council could commit certain countries to take the initiative and protect basic EU values on behalf of the EU.

The ambition „to be where decisions are made“  makes Baltic States to give more attention to CSDP. Maybe it is worth while changing the venue of decision-making from the NATO Council to the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS), moreover that the Lisbon Treaty stipulates more powers to the EC regarding CSDP. Several years ago the Baltic States suspected that France and Germany sought to create a „club“ in the sphere of security and defense for making key solutions without “slowly moving” EU Member States. The Lisbon Treaty legalized formation of the above groupings, but at the same time created conditions for regulation of the process. Therefore, today quite a lot depends on our diplomats‘ ability to negotiate more favorable conditions for joining „strengthened cooperation”, and to specify the commitments of collective defense.

Surely, some EU Member States might pursue the development of a “two-speed” CSDP. Therefore, by supporting the idea of „One Voice Europe“, the Baltic States are not less concerned about what this „one voice“ would say.  The Baltic States will not be able to influence this voice until they are not able to coordinate their actions and expand cooperation with other small EU Member States. In search for partners in Northern Europe, we must not forget the Vyshegrad Group (V4); its experience and interests are similar to ours and V4 seeks to overcome similar fears. Thus, if Baltic States and the Vyshegrad Group countries are able to find a compromise on key CSDP issues, their initiatives and support to specific projects could have major impact on the development of the entire CSDP. However, it is not enough to have a will; it is necessary to take specific actions for coordination and implementation of the common strategy of small Baltic, Northern and Vyshegrad states.

By Dr. Arūnas Molis 2010 06 07

You left Brussels roughly a year ago to become president of Lithuania. Recent months have seen the EU go through major turmoil – not least the adoption and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Now that you are back on the national side of the European equation, do you sense that the EU is moving in the right direction and moving ahead?

Europe is always moving, sometimes faster, sometimes slower and also not always in the right direction, especially when we face global challenges in the financial sector, a slowdown in Europe and some serious problems in some countries in the euro zone.

This year was very turbulent in all member states and this, of course, slowed down all strategic discussions, including the Lisbon Treaty’s implementation, the creation of the [European] External [Action] Service [and] discussions on budgetary reform, which were practically postponed.

So, a lot of things have been on hold during this year. Of course, Europe has moved ahead but very, very slowly – sometimes with long stops to think.

Do you think this crisis can be considered as a step backwards in order to jump further forwards?

All crises give the chance to rethink the direction. Will Europe take everything as a lesson? It is not yet clear, but at least there is an understanding that when there are global problems, we need to have a global approach: when there are regional problems, we need a regional approach. Only a European approach, or member states’ approach, is not sufficient at all. A lot of our institutions need to be reformed and redesigned to face global challenges.

This understanding is coming, but it is not shaping institutions yet. We discuss possible future new institutions – supervisory, credit rating agencies, a new European fund – but it is only discussion.

We could miss this opportunity. If we don’t use this crisis to redesign our governance, time will be lost.

Let’s look at the picture in more detail. Last week EU leaders put together a rescue plan to prevent the collapse of the euro zone. There is general consent that this rescue package is big enough to buy Europe time to put its house in order. What do you think needs to be done to put Europe’s house in order?

You are right. We are buying time. If we don’t do anything during this time, the investment of the rescue package will be lost and misused.

It is not the problem of one country, Greece. It is the problem of the whole euro zone, as it is a problem of fiscal policy and how it is controlled and harmonised.

In Europe we have a common currency, but we have neither a monetary nor a fiscal policy. In reality, for that we used the Growth and Stability Pact with the Maastricht criteria, which were supposed to prevent fiscal populism or misbehaviour by member states.

But in 2005, member states themselves laundered this pact. It became a rubber pact where you can inflow as much as possible flexibility without responsibility. That happened just before the crisis.

I think it was mistake. Having a common currency and no mechanism strict enough to control and push member states to behave responsibly is a mistake. Sooner or later the problem would occur. It was sped up by the external global crisis, which brought to the surface all weaknesses and bottlenecks of the fiscal and monetary situation in Europe.

Here is a more general problem. It is not only the problem of Greece, but a generalised problem of the euro zone and also for future applicants to the European economic area, like Lithuania.

If one country is allowed to misbehave, to bluff with information, to avoid paying its full share to the European budget, to make uncoordinated moves in economic policy, the system collapses.

We did not back our common currency with common policies. That discrepancy could not last forever. A currency without a common monetary and fiscal policy is an artificial design.

Last week, the European Commission proposed a surveillance mechanism for national budget plans – with a sanction system of cutting regional aid for countries that infringe EU budget rules. Is this a first step towards better coordination and perhaps one day a common European monetary and fiscal policy?

The Commission proposed a warning mechanism to try to push member states themselves to be more responsible, but it is not coordinated efforts or harmonisation of fiscal policies.

It is only what the Commission can propose at this stage. The rest depends on the member states: on whether they want to coordinate, harmonise or even manage together fiscal policies. That is what is important.

Do you think control over national budgets compromises sovereignty?

It is a warning mechanism, rather than real control.

But European Central Bank executive board member Jürgen Stark has even proposed the establishment of an independent commission to check member states budgets.

That is just not possible, because the control of budgets in member states is the responsibility of parliaments. You cannot give this duty to anybody else. We are not a federal state yet.

IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn called last week for budgetary coordination and short-term fiscal transfers as a way of avoiding a repeat of the crisis that has shaken financial market. As a former commissioner for budget, what do you think of this?

Theoretically, there is a difference between a federalist state and a union like ours with 27 member states and 27 budget procedures, and really it is not possible to have automatic transfers without changing the EU Treaty. But I can’t really say, because I do not know the substance of his proposal.

Let’s go back to economic governance. The Reflection Group chaired by Felipe González just released its report, in which it calls for economic governance to be urgently strengthened to solve the problem of the co-existence of monetary union and the single market with divergent national economic policies. But for that you need leadership. Does Europe have such leadership?

It is not just about leadership in each member state. What you need is European leadership, and I stress ‘European’. You need unity and understanding that together we are stronger than separate.

What we need is real European leadership. Do we go into deeper integration or we grow more like a club of friends?

To be able to manage collectively global challenges, we need to be united and integrated more deeply. We need to speak with one voice on troubles that are affecting us all, whether in trade or in financial markets. But there is still a long way to go, because in the EU we only have two common policies: the rest is only gentlemen’s agreement.

Programmes, initiatives and directions we take together are not obligatory. Mechanisms are loose. The EU’s internal legal framework does not allow the European institutions to govern in that way without consulting governments.

Again, everything is based on and restricted by the EU Treaty.

You have been on both sides, as a European commissioner and now as president of Lithuania. Is there a way to get our act together and make the EU work better and be respected by the rest of the world? Last week, it took a call from US President Barack Obama to push Merkel and Sarkozy to come up with a consistent package. Isn’t that a slap in the face? The same happened in Copenhagen. How many slaps in the face will it take to make EU leaders act like leaders?

Europe would have made that move without the US president’s call, because the situation was deteriorating. The financial markets are more integrated than governments are. Markets are so global that the sickness of one market in Europe became a huge sickness for transatlantic markets – they are tightly interrelated. Some policies have already outgrown the European dress. They need to be global. This is why reforming our financial institutions – the World Bank, IMF, etc – is a necessity.

The call was not just to help Europe, but to help the United States’ markets. Let’s be open. It’s not because we did not have European leadership.

The rescue package was very much under preparation, but of course the problem was discussions taking place within each and every member state, where citizens were questioning why they had to pay for countries that misbehaved.

But you are right that by the Thursday and Friday, the crisis was overflowing Europe’s borders. That’s why the call came. Not because of a lack of European leadership.

There is increasing talk about a European monetary fund and an EU credit rating agency. Are these sound ideas or just a waste of time?

There is a desperate necessity to look at how to manage situations regionally and internationally. I am not sure that a European monetary fund or an EU credit rating agency is sufficient.

Precisely, your question regarding President’s Obama call shows that problems – especially on financial markets – are global, trade issues are global, monetary problems are global. Regional institutions can partly respond to the problem and I think we need to be realistic: without the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, we cannot solve these problems.

Global markets are already a ‘federation’ and even more than that – they are so much united that we governments in different regions are running after them.

In Europe, our integration and decision-making process is still very slow. For us it is even more difficult to react.

But I am not sure that a European fund or any other European institution can be a total solution – maybe as a transitional element helping Europe itself to be more coordinated, but not to solve global problems.

Europe 2020, the Reflection Group report, a new strategy for the single market, the budget review. There are many proposals floating around the EU. Isn’t this rather a lot of noise? Would you say it is a symphony or a cacophony?

You know, I like Europe because it’s noisy. Because each noise is different, but finally we are turning somewhere, where we can understand one another. I think it is some kind of mix: cacophony and symphony.

It is always difficult, it is always under discussion, we always have different opinions, but this is why Europe is different from any other world political entity.

You are right to say that Europe 2020 is very general and is not a solution for all problems. It is mainly a roadmap, giving a sense of direction for the next 10 years. But it is clear that you cannot solve, with that kind of strategy, citizens’ everyday lives.

It is clear that it will be disrupted by reality and everyday changes. We will not exit from the crisis at the same time as we deal with the stimulus packages we introduced and the fiscal pressure we have created. That will take probably half of the strategy time for Europe.

It will also depend very much on how other areas outside Europe develop: China, India, Japan, and the United States.

Although it is right to push ourselves, see the vision and seek direction, for quantitative measures it is quite difficult to set a goal and expect that to be reached and we will be prosperous. It does not happen like that.

But as a general trend on how we want to see ourselves in 10, 15, 20 years, it is a good idea.

Of course, the quality and the ownership of the document – and all through its implementation – will always be under discussion. But this is good.

Any strategy needs to be open to change and adapt to reality, because life is changing fast and our documents too.

What do you think should be kept in Europe 2020 and what should be scrapped?

I am not very much upset with one part or the other. I’m just saying that if we want a strategy for 10 years, we cannot close our mind thinking that is the final project. Be open…if we need to, we’ll change it, and now just go ahead with what we have on the table.

You are basically repeating what you said in your budget review principles: let’s be flexible and learn from our mistakes …

Yes. Life will change our understanding and we need to change our papers.

Do you think Europe 2020 shows that we have learned from mistakes made with the Lisbon Strategy?

Not yet. The reason I say this is that in Europe 2020 we have fewer indicators. It is more structured, but a mechanism of control of member states’ commitment and ownership is still weak.

This is all we need: no matter what we write in the document.

A report released by former Internal Market Commissioner Mario Monti concluded that we need to refocus on the single market and complete our work. Have we sidelined the single market?

Partly, yes. Up to maybe 10 years ago, our discussions focused much on a confederative attitude towards governance, towards economics, towards the internal market.

We have now stopped a bit after enlargement. But an economic area without deeper integration and especially without a common currency in more than half of the countries is just not possible.

To integrate more economically, we also need to integrate in other areas – in financial sectors and services. This is why the single market is far from being finalised and we are far away.

But if we don’t have a completed single market, it is very difficult to talk about coordination of economic, monetary and fiscal policies. And if you don’t coordinate, you cannot speak with one voice, and cannot decide in one shot.

Again, that means that Europe will be the political entity that is too diverse, too difficult to talk to and [finds it] too difficult to make decisions.

Monti also calls for tax coordination as a way to even up the divide between Anglo-Saxon and social market economic models in Europe. Do you think the divide is preventing the EU from functioning properly?

It depends what you mean by that. We do have already some coordination on indirect taxation. We have already started discussion on coordinating the basis of taxation – how it is calculated and so on.

For example, some countries say they do not have corporate tax but in reality they do, as they introduce it at the second or third stage of corporate activity. It’s again [a question of] what you put in the definition. The best would be probably to have tax coordination on the basis but not the tariffs.

The measures you put in place to fight the economic crisis can be coordinated. It is not harmonisation, but coordination of policies.

Tax policy is already ideology and it is the reflection of economic policy and an economic basis – that means single market. If you do not have the single market, you cannot have the same single tax.

The less the area is integrated, the less you can have tax coordination. In areas of the single market where we are more integrated, we can have joint tax policy. You cannot have a top-down approach on taxation, it would be rejected.

Take for example the so-called European tax: everybody has a different definition for it. For some it is VAT, for others it is consumption tax, for others it is an energy consumption element. To have a real European tax, we need a fully integrated internal market. Taxes reflect the quality and level of integration: you cannot have artificial tax coordination.

Lithuania will assume the EU presidency for the first time in 2013. What will Europe look like then?

We will have a stable recovery by then. But we will still be recovering from huge stimulus packages and huge deficits in most countries. But the economy will be better off and growth will be on the rise.

For Europe, the key questions will be demographic pressure, innovation and deeper interconnection of economic policies. I believe the common control and supervisory institutions which Europe wants will probably be in place or shaping up.

We will probably have set up some of the elements resulting from the post-crisis situation to avoid further crisis. 2013 will also be the final year for the financial perspectives negotiations. 

All our problems will be very much reflected in the new EU financial framework and in the budget for seven years (or five).

Are you going to push for a common EU energy market during your presidency?

It is a real necessity for our region because we are isolated – in energy, gas and infrastructure.

If we are talking about the internal market, it needs to be integrated not only in goods and services, but also in energy infrastructure. 

Now, we don’t have a common policy in many areas, but we can agree. We do not need to change treaties to have a political agreement on a common energy policy or foreign policy. It only takes the Council and governments to agree – a gentlemen’s agreement.

We can do a lot of things without changing the EU Treaty. We don’t need to formalise them.

We need to move ahead, because after enlargement, economic integration in many areas has just not been completed.

Six years after enlargement, we have a fragmented single market – we have pieces, not a common market – in energy, in transport, in railways and in electricity grids, Lithuania is isolated.

Take the electricity grid, for example: Western Europe works on one system, we work on the Russian system. If you think about it, not only it looks strange, but it is not very secure.

Without energy infrastructure and trans-European networks at the borders, we are just not one economic area. We are still pieces or a few economic areas. I am not only talking about the Baltic states, but also about Romania and Bulgaria. In the future we will see the Balkans in the same situation.

It looks like the political process of enlargement went faster than economic integration.

The Lithuanian prime minister was in the US last week. The Latvian prime minister discussed bilateral cooperation on energy with the US that same week. Are the Baltic states losing the interest of investors from the European Union?

I would say no. It is rather the opposite. The main investors in the Baltic states are from Europe, especially from the Scandinavian countries, Germany and France. European investments are dominant. Of course, we do have investors coming from our neighbours – that means Russia also.

But US investments are very symbolic compared to other investments. The prime minister was there to attract investors in high-tech information technology. He signed a letter of intent with IBM to set up a joint research centre in Lithuania.

But otherwise in the whole region European investors are dominant.

Last week, Estonia bid to enter the euro zone. Do you think this is wise? If the Baltic states join the euro zone without solving their competitiveness problem beforehand, they will face the same problems as Greece. Merkel said over the weekend that there is a need to bridge the gap between Europe’s strongest and weakest economies. Do you think that is true?

I hope what Madame Merkel said was not referring to Estonia. She is right in general that the differences between member states are still huge. But structural funds are there for countries to catch up, especially for those behaving responsibly. Estonia from this point of view was the best pupil in the school.

Before the crisis, their budget was positive. After the crisis they posted not more than a 2-3% deficit. The political elite always behaved responsibly, never bluffing statistics, economising expenditures, people were supportive of all restrictive measures during the crisis…so from this point of view, Estonia can be seen as the best example of member states that during the crisis were able to master all the Maastricht criteria.

It is a good example for all of us to see how in difficult times, if you are behaving responsibly, you can achieve a lot.

It all boils down to political responsibility, doesn’t it?

Absolutely. The euro is not just a goal, but a tool for responsible policies. That’s how I see it. In Lithuania too, de facto we have the euro, because our currency is pegged to the euro. But my country was not always behaving responsibly. Not always.

Estonia, from this point of view, is a good example for everybody.

Realistically, when do you think these countries will be able to get into the euro zone?

Each of the Baltic states is in a different situation. For us, the big problem is the deficit, but it depends very much on the recovery. Each of the Baltic states makes about 1% of EU GDP. In reality, we influence nothing. We will not jeopardise anybody. We can be good or bad examples, but only on behaviour, not on economic influence.

What happens outside our countries will directly influence our economies, because we are very open and very liberal, but unprotected. We still think 2014-2015 is possible, but it all depends on how we manage, as well as on the outside situation.

Last question: There is a pervasive sense across the EU of integration fatigue and Monti clearly stressed this in his report. Do you think Europe is taken for granted and how can we get out of this fatigue? Do you think a global Europe could revive the sense of solidarity that seems lost?

Indeed, Europe was created because of leaders’ solidarity in helping each other. And this, as you rightly said, is more taken for granted, especially for some new member states.

It looks as though Europe is an overgrown teenager, who was growing faster than the clothes he is wearing. Internally, we also need to adjust enlargement in everything: in political terms, economic integration, responsibility, solidarity. That we might be in a rethinking pause of enlargement is also clear, because we need to adjust not only our institutions, but we need to redesign our common policies.

You cannot go for further enlargement with the same Common Agricultural Policy. It is too costly. The same applies to regional policy, because the less effective it will be.

We need to change along with enlargement, which we really have not done yet. 

Critics within Lithuania note that while there is justification for sending its troops to Afghanistan to deny those who harbored the fanatics responsible for 9/11 a return to power, support for the Bush administration’s ill considered invasion of Iraq was unjustified. Furthermore, while Lithuania’s commitment to expanding the zone of democracy in the former Soviet space is a noble undertaking, does such an ambitious enterprise make sense given its domestic problems and foreign policy challenges?  Of course, it must adhere to its principles but it must also acknowledge its vulnerabilities and proceed with caution. As every freshman university student knows: “politics is the art of the possible.” What is more, democracy cannot be exported; it must evolve out of a country’s history, culture and current political matrix.

There is, of course, a simple retort to those who criticize Lithuania for embracing the American narrative of what is best for Eastern and Central Europe. How could Lithuania refuse any request for help from the country that has done more than any other one to achieve its foreign policy priorities: for example, making NATO membership possible and encouraging Brussels to open the EU’s door to it as well? How could it refuse any request from the U.S. that alone possesses the military might to protect it in event of an attack from the east–no matter how unlikely an armed threat from that quarter may be?

But now the people responsible for the Iraq disaster have left office and their neo-conservative supporters of imprudent American unilateralism have been discredited, so the time has come for Lithuania to adopt policies that do not originate in Washington. It is not a matter, as some fear, that the administration of President Barack Obama is any less supportive of Lithuania than was true of his predecessor. He has indicated categorically that he remains committed to the security of all of NATO’s members. Indeed, his pledge to honor Article 5 should be enhanced by the fact that he has help burnish America’s image in the eyes of the international community. Also at Tallinn, his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has pledged that the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing it nuclear weapons from Europe at this time. A policy favored by leaders in Central and Eastern Europe along with most of them in the Western half of the Continent as well.

Meanwhile, Lithuania must look to the EU to help it address its foreign policy challenges; a major question being how to reconcile Lithuanian-Russian friction. Given its size, enormous economic and political power, the EU certainly can provide help on this vital matter. But there is a big question mark here: will the EU operate like a truly united union and confront Russia with a single EU policy on a host of matters vital to Lithuania’s welfare such as energy security? The answer to date is a resounding: “No!”

Indeed, there is disturbing evidence that the larger members of the EU are moving along a path that is marked by bi-lateral and not multi-lateral policies in their dealings with Russia. In the process, they have dismissed expressions of concern on the part of member states that once were part of, or associated with the former Soviet Union. This is curious since the leaders of France and Germany have long complained with justification that their counter-parts in Washington have ignored their interests and have rejected their inputs in matters that profoundly concern them. Yet they are guilty of precisely the same thing when it comes to the smaller members of the EU.

Clearly then it is a major foreign policy goal of Lithuania to secure close and harmonious relations with neighboring states that understand why the Baltic democracies are worried about their vulnerability to those in Moscow who have used Russia’s energy assets to compromise their sovereignty and political influence to isolate them. Poland and the Nordic States fit that category, consequently Lithuania’s leaders have indicated on many occasions that close and harmonious relations with both entities represent a priority for them. But at the same time, many commentators have observed that Lithuanian domestic politics threaten to compromise relations with the Poles and the Nordic countries.

Two days before his plane crashed in Smolensk, Polish president Lech Kasczynski met with his Lithuanian counter-part Dalia Grybauskaite and said that he hoped the dispute over how Polish names were spelled would be resolved. The Polish media had blistered the Lithuanian Seimas for endorsing a law that would proscribe Poles from using characters common to the Polish language that were not found in Lithuanian. The law, its supporters contended, would protect the Lithuanian language from being corrupted by outside influences. Both Grybauskaite and Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius indicated that they also hoped that the Seimas would pass a law with which Lithuanian Poles could live. Kubilius asked: is the Lithuanian language so weak that it cannot allow its Polish citizens to use the names that their parents gave them?

Indeed, one of Lithuania’s most celebrated values over the centuries has been its tolerance for minority peoples living within its borders. At the same time, there is a compelling practical reason for Lithuania to have good relations with a neighbor almost ten times it size; an ally that is likewise a member of the EU and NATO and a country that has been applauded for its successful economic policies and new promising foreign policy initiatives. On this last matter, the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has received high marks for reconciling differences with Germany, and allied observers have expressed hope that a reconciliation of Polish-Russian relations is in the works as well.

The tragic death of the Polish president has created a truly historic prospect: the end of Polish-Russian enmity that has characterized relations between the two peoples for centuries. Even bitter critics of the Kremlin, like The Economist’s Edward Lucas has praised Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for his sincere display of remorse after the president and his entourage crashed in Smolensk. They were on their way to a commemeration of the Katyn forest massacre of 20,000 Polish military personnel at the hands of Stalin’s agents. Foreign commentators expressed amazement after Putin first conceded that the Soviets and not the Nazis were responsible for the massacre, and then agreed to commemorate the evil deed at a ceremony attended by high-level Polish and Russian officials.

It is especially noteworthy that Zbigniew Brzezinski, a man whose name does not bring smiles to the faces of the Kremlin overlords, has joined the chorus of those Western analysts who have had high praise for Putin and sees this expression of harmony between Warsaw and Moscow as a possible huge resetting of relations between these ancient adversaries. “I do not think that this is a game on the part of Russia,” he wrote in Time Magazine, “this is something sincere and very new.” The former national security advisor of President Jimmy Carter and a man with influence in the Obama administration concludes that if this is evidence of reconciliation on the part of Poland and Russia, “it will be geo-politically potentially equal to the importance of German-Polish reconciliation.”

Only time will tell whether this outcome takes place but should it occur it could have huge potentially positive implications for Lithuania’s relations with Moscow. Consequently, it is imperative that any differences between Lithuania and Poland be reconciled.

Turning to close relations with the Nordic States, a recent Swedish graduate of Vilnius University has written a provocative but balanced assessment of a major barrier to those relations. In the English language portal, the Lithuanian Tribune, Fredrik Rydström has observed that the Nordic countries did not pay much attention to Lithuania until the summer of 2009, “when information about the ‘law on the protection of minors’ first hit the newsstands. Thus Lithuania went from being perceived of as a nonentity to a nation of homophobes virtually overnight. Consequently, despite all efforts to promote a positive image of Lithuania abroad, what finally has struck is the conceptualization of a nation which strives to institutionalize homophobia.”

These are tough words and Rydström warns Scandinavian critics to be careful not to be self-righteous in their criticism of Lithuania. In his experience, most Lithuanians do not dwell on homosexuality and it is irresponsible for foreign commentators to exaggerate its importance to them. But he himself strikes a further blow when he makes the following observation. “…when Lithuanian authorities assert that Lithuania has its own values as opposed to those espoused by the EU, the phraseology is not without importance. This is the case since there is another country in Europe which recurrently has invoked similar explanations when trying to justify its circumvention or sheer neglect of human rights, namely Russia.”

In its quest to join the EU and NATO, Lithuania has pledged to embrace the democratic values of both organizations. Without dismissing real concerns that a small country like Lithuania has about the sanctity of its language and values, it is clear that it must honor that pledge. The truth is that in today’s world, there cannot be a dramatic disconnect between a country’s domestic practices and its international commitments.

Dick Krickus is professor emeritus at the University of Mary Washington and has held the H. L. Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University.

In mid-March, narcissuses, crocuses, and tulips are in full bloom in Belgium. You can find these flowers everywhere: in Brussels and in the cozy suburbs surrounding the city, such as Ukkel (where the Russian Embassy, a beautiful building and a pond, is located). Russia’s envoy to NATO Dmitriy Rogozhin hosted the Ekspress Nedelia journalist in the luxurious foyer of the embassy.

(Ekspress Nedelia) I would first like to explain to the readers what the Permanent Mission of Russia to NATO is doing and the difference between the mission and the Russian Embassy in Belgium, which is located in the same building. I also would like to explain to the readers the difference between your work and the work of the “ordinary” diplomats in Brussels.

(Rogozin) Perhaps only the divers – or to be more exact the divers who can go down some 50 meters or more, where the ocean is full of sharks and other sea beasts, and to be even more exact, the divers who can do all that without the aqualung – could understand the difference. I used to participate in the underwater sports and I know what I am talking about. So, we can say that the Russian Permanent Mission to NATO is a group of Russian diplomats and military officers placed in the predatory environment. We are a group of 37. This is a big group of people, but we work in several buildings, not just in the embassy, but also in the NATO headquarters in Brussels and in the NATO Military Command in Mons.

Our work is based on the activities of the working groups, which, in a way, reflects the structures that exist in NATO. Moreover, there is the Russia-NATO Council, which organizes summits of the presidents, the heads of the Foreign or Defence Ministries, or the commanders of the Defence Headquarters at least twice a year… We spend the rest of the time having meetings at the ambassadorial level and the level of steering committees.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What about your status? Do the people call you “Your Excellence,” just as they do the Russian ambassador to Belgium?

(Rogozin) Well, they do call me “Your Excellency.”

(Ekspress Nedelia) Do you have an aide-de-camp?

(Rogozin) I have an aide-de-camp, a BMW, and a Ducati, if you are interested in such things. I have all that.

(Ekspress Nedelia) If it is not a secret, are you paid less than the Russian ambassador to Belgium?

(Rogozin) The amount of my salary is established by the Russian Government, which has set up the Russian Permanent Mission to NATO. I have the same salary as the Russian ambassador to Belgium, and the chief military adviser earns 95 per cent of the ambassador’s salary, paid in euro.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What are the specifics of your work?

(Rogozin) I find it difficult to relate myself to diplomats, because I came from politics.

(Ekspress Nedelia) And you came to politics from journalism!

(Rogozin) There are diplomats who think that the art of diplomacy is not to reveal your thoughts. Unlike diplomats, politicians are seeking to express their thoughts clearly and concisely. Considering the delicate balance in the relations between Russia and NATO, the diplomats have to work with public opinion issues, besides working with each other. There is a difference between our work and the work of the Permanent Missions to the UN or the EU, the Permanent Mission to NATO deals with issues that have to do with war and peace…

(Ekspress Nedelia) You have once said that Russian diplomacy has to be like an iron fist in a soft kid glove.

(Rogozin) Or like a wise head in a strong helmet.

(Ekspress Nedelia) In your opinion, is NATO an aggressive organization?

(Rogozin) It is a military-political organization.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Does it pose any threat to Russia?

(Rogozin) If you have in mind the NATO troops deployed near the border with Russia, they do not pose any threat, because it is obvious that the number of such troops is not sufficient to be seen as a threat. On the other hand, there is a certain discomfort. Believe me, I feel genuinely hurt when people are playing the game of war! Everybody understands that Russia does not pose any threat. And we feel a certain degree of discomfort when we see that somebody is acting childish and irresponsible.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Perhaps Russia could join NATO? NATO leaders have mentioned such a possibility: Robertson was the first to mention the idea; then Ruhe, former defence minister of the Federal Republic of Germany; then it was Naumann, former head of the NATO Military Planning Committee; and finally the current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and US State Secretary Hillary Clinton.

(Rogozin) I can rephrase your question: Perhaps NATO could join Russia? On a serious note, I do not understand how the people can part with something very precious to them. I have in mind the sovereignty of a country, the country’s right to be in charge of its own armed forces and the right to have its own foreign policy.

(Ekspress Nedelia) This summer, NATO will conduct a large-scale military training in the Baltic countries. NATO’s “hawks” are saying that this is a response to “Russia’s aggressive ambitions in this region.” What can you say about these military manoeuvres?

(Rogozin) This is absurd. On the other hand, I must say I am genuinely happy for the prostitutes living in Klaipeda. They perhaps would be the only ones who will benefit directly from the disembarkation of the US Marine Corps in this Lithuanian city.

(Ekspress Nedelia) May I quote your words?

(Rogozin) You are welcome to do that!

(Ekspress Nedelia) What can you say about the recent NATO military exercise in the Baltic skies? If I am correct, you promised $1 million to anybody who proves that the manoeuvres, in which the potential adversary was “some Eastern land,” were not directed against Russia?

(Rogozin) I am sure NATO did not mean that the manoeuvres were organized to act against the aggressive plans of Iran. I am stunned. It ridiculous to think that the two L-39 fighter planes Lithuania has, (which are actually training aircraft), or the two tanks Estonia and Latvia have, could pose any threat to the security or the sovereignty of Russia. But what really worries us is the fact that the NATO military structure, and  even more so the US military structure, is drawing closer to our borders, for example the Patriot missiles in Poland.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What is your take on the current Russia-NATO relations? What can you say about the reassurance of the NATO leaders who are saying that NATO does not pose any threat to Russia? And what can you say about the statements by some Baltic politicians that Russia poses a threat to the Baltic countries?

(Rogozin) The relations between Russia and NATO are like “an average temperature in a hospital.” For example, there are partners who do not want our relations to deteriorate and speak in favour of mutual understanding in strategic issues. And there are countries that see nightmares in the sleep that the Russians are coming to their countries, and they wet their beds in sleep. We should remember that NATO is a group of 28 countries, and that what NATO Secretary General Rasmussen is saying is an average (consensus) opinion. The same goes for NATO foreign policy; it is also an average of foreign policies of all the NATO members.

(Ekspress Nedelia) It is noteworthy that Georgian President Saakashvili shares the fears of some of the Baltic politicians. We all remember the television show broadcast by the Imedi television station, which scared the wits out of many residents of Georgia and even of many European officials. Even EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso spoke at the joint conference with Georgian Prime Minister Gilauri, urging “to drop any activities that could lead to a political tension on the local and the regional levels.”

(Rogozin) No comments. Mr Saakashvili is a “sick person” whom we cannot help.

(Ekspress Nedelia) But do you think there is any possibility that the “sick person” will get well and will “mature” enough to become a NATO member?

(Rogozin) Who? Saakashvili?

(Ekspress Nedelia) No, I have in mind Georgia.

(Rogozin)I do not think so. But this is my personal opinion.

(Ekspress Nedelia) What about the United States? This country plays the leading role in NATO.

(Rogozin)Indeed, the United States plays a big role in NATO, but this role is not the decisive one. To explain this to you in business terms, the United States has the “blocking stake” in NATO, but certainly not the “controlling stake.” Even though the United States could carry out its own policy in NATO, it prefers to share the responsibility or to burden others with the responsibility. Generally speaking, NATO’s intention is collective responsibility for the decisions.

(Ekspress Nedelia) In your opinion, what role does Lithuania play in NATO? Judging by the continuous declarations made by some Lithuanian politicians and the verbal attacks on Russia, Vilnius is playing an important role in NATO.

(Rogozin) I will tell you this: In Soviet times, we saw the people living in the Baltic countries as someone extraordinary. The Baltic countries were in a way a “show window” of the Soviet system. It was a great thing to live in the Baltic countries…. I remember, when I was in the 9th grade, the girl I liked told me that she had a friend living in a Baltic country. She said that to hurt my feelings, because it turned out later on that the friend was only in her imagination…. The situation has changed now. Not long ago, I was coming back from my trip to London and had a chat with a Lithuanian woman at the airport. She was very eager to tell me about her life in the United Kingdom….

(Ekspress Nedelia) In Russian?

(Rogozin)Yes, even though it was very difficult for her.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Did she recognize you? Did she know that she was talking to the Russian envoy to NATO?

(Rogozin )No. Young people are not interest in these things. Coming back to the issue of Lithuania, there are three aspects that we should consider. In Brussels, I have a wonderful and a very constructive relationship with the Lithuanian envoy to NATO Linas Linkevicius.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Who came to diplomacy from politics, and to politics from journalism, just like you?

(Rogozin) I did not know that. Well, we meet, have coffee, and speak about everything openly. On the other hand, Lithuania is one of the “cheerleaders” of various campaigns directed against Russia. And, finally, Lithuania wants to convince everybody that nobody knows Russia better than Lithuania does. But if in the past such strategy worked, now it does not.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Neither Russia, nor even France managed to convince the Lithuanian politicians that the contract for the purchase of the two French assault helicopter ships Mistral does not pose any threat to the peace and stability in the region.

(Rogozin) On the one hand, NATO is saying that the cooperation with Russia should be strengthened, and that the Alliance is highly interested in the acquisition of Russian military equipment, for example the “helicopter set” for the NATO operations in Afghanistan. On the other hand, when we want to buy from our NATO partner two ships, there are problems. This is illogical.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Several years ago, you successfully solved the problem of the Kaliningrad transit, when a perfect solution was found (acceptable to all the parties involved: Russia, Lithuania, and the EU). How serious are the disagreements between Russia and Lithuania as far as military issues are concerned?

(Rogozin) To begin with, there is no military cooperation between Russia and Lithuania. The problem of military transit remains unsolved. And, as you know, NATO is interested in the transit of its military shipments through the Russian territory (3,500 km) to the border with Kazakhstan. And we cannot solve the problem of the transit of our military shipments through the territory that is less than 200 km.

Nevertheless, the prospects for the Russian-Lithuanian relations are positive. All we need is the Lithuanian elite to focus its attention on constructive relations with Russia.

(Ekspress Nedelia) Do you have friends among Lithuanian politicians? With whom would you like to play basketball or tennis?

(Rogozin) Gediminas Kirkilas who came to Brussels last year, when he still was prime minister. I have already mentioned Linas Linkevicius. By the way, basketball is a good idea, we have a good team here and we often play with our partners from NATO countries. The Americans beat us once (there are members of the Naval Force on the team), but we played a very nasty trick on them, something only the Russians are capable of doing, we proposed them several boxes of vodka and Abkhazian wine, and we tied the score after half an hour.

P.S. (from Vladas Liubartas, the journalist): On my way back from Brussels to Vilnius, I was on the same plane as now former Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas. He asked me to give Mr Rogozhin his greetings, and when I mentioned the possible basketball game, he offered to organize it in…Afghanistan.

Lithuania is among the group of Moderate innovators 2009, with an innovation performance below the EU-27 average, however, with a rate of improvement above that of the EU-27. The indicated Lithuania’s strengths are in Human resources, Finance and support and Linkages & entrepreneurship. Over the past 5 years, Human resources, Finance and support and Throughputs have been the main drivers of the improvement in Lithuania’s innovation performance, in particular as a result from strong growth in S&E and SSH doctorate graduates (14.8%), Private credit (21.5%), EPO patents (15.5%) and Community trademarks (26.8%).

Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK are the Innovation leaders, with innovation performance well above that the EU-27 average and all other countries. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia are the Innovation followers, with innovation performance below those of the Innovation leaders but close to or above that of the EU-27 average.

Paet and Kouchner agreed that good defence-related co-operation exists between Estonia and France and that it should become even closer.

Foreign Minister Urmas Paet thanked his French colleague for the air policing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – starting in January, France is participating in the air policing mission over the Baltic states.

“France is participating in the Baltic air policing mission for the second time already, and we greatly appreciate that,” stated Paet.

While talking about security co-operation, the ministers also addressed the sale of Mistral-type ships to Russia.

Paet confirmed that Estonia has submitted its official application to become the home country for the European Union IT agency for justice, freedom and security.

“We feel it is important to use information technology more effectively than before in the European Union internal security sector, which is why it is necessary to create a separate IT agency. Taking into consideration Estonia’s highly-developed IT sector, we believe that Estonia possesses all the qualifications to be a good location for the agency,” stated the foreign minister. “Establishing the IT agency in Estonia would create useful co-operation opportunities for both us and France regarding the more effective use of information technology in the European Union internal security sector,” Paet added.

The Estonian Foreign Minister said that it is important to adhere to the 2003 decision of the European Council, according to which new European Union agencies should be located in new member states.

Also addressed at the meeting was Estonia’s candidacy to become an observer in the International Organisation of the Francophonie (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie – OIF). Foreign Minister Urmas Paet stated that many cultural points of contact have formed between Estonia and the francophone cultural space.

“Estonia feels it is important for international integration to be as close as possible; this includes contacts with countries in the French cultural space. The International Organisation of the Francophonie subscribes to the same goals that Estonia prioritises in its foreign policy – the promotion of democracy, human rights and freedoms and the assurance of peace and development. Observer status in the International Organisation of the Francophonie would help give additional momentum to cultural exchange and research co-operation with francophone countries,” he said.

The OIF unites 70 nations, including 14 observer states across the globe.

While talking about accession to the euro zone, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet noted that Estonia would like to join the euro zone at the beginning of 2011.

The national defence minister said that she could not say calmly that the Lithuanian armed forces were prepared to defend the country taking into account the present circumstances. “The situation is not the most favourable one, the long-term lack of finance for the national defence system, a lot of propaganda saying that everything is alright and that we have ones of the strongest armed forces in the world have largely affected the national defence system. Add the crisis, cutbacks in finance and we are on the brink of an abyss,” Jukneviciene said.

The minister agreed with the position of Arvydas Anusauskas, head of the Seimas’ National Security and Defence Committee, that the ongoing situation might pose a threat to national security.”There is a lack of money to perform all functions. To compare with other states, Lithuania has the smallest army; there is a question whether we will reduce it even more. Soldiers receive lower pays, but we do not have money to ensure them a possibility of constant training, learning to defend their country,” Jukneviciene said.

The national defence minister noted that Lithuania had to abandon its defence attaches to Great Britain, Germany and France due to cut funding of representation offices, even though their presence was very important for communication with NATO.

According to Jukneviciene, Lithuania might not be able to be an Alliance member due to the constant reduction of funding. The minister emphasised that our country was reproached for that all the time. NATO member states are obliged to allocate 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to national defence. “The Estonians retain the level of 1.8 percent of GDP, Lithuania has dropped to 0.9 percent and approaches 0.8 percent of GDP, which means that soon we will be unable to be NATO members. Our partnership is very important, solidarity is crucial, and if we do not make at least a minimum input to be ready to defend our country, NATO will soon raise a question whether we indeed want to be NATO members,” Jukneviciene warned.

The national defence minister said that she did not ask for additional money to national defence this year. However, the minister stressed that the state budget for next year should foresee that the funding for the national defence system would not be below 1 percent of GDP.

Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius promised to find ways to increase funding. “In the difficult financial situation, it was not very easy to increase funding in any way. Our common goal is to ensure that at least 1 percent of GDP would be reached, though the NATO standard is 2 percent,” Kubilius said.

Since the beginning of her term in office, President Dalia Grybauskaitė has not stopped to surprise us with radical decisions: a vocal reaction to the CIA prisons, invitation to Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenka, somewhat strange communication with Dmitriy Medvedev regarding Lithuanian auto carriers and regarding anniversary commemorations, failure to invite Mikhail Saakashvili to the 11 March commemoration, and, finally, rejection to meet with Barack Obama in Prague. No one had promised such a drama: who could have believed that the foreign policy guidelines of the grey and abstract president would gain such colours and such a speed?…

Back then no one was able to get an answer from the president’s team how Lithuania’s interests would be defended (the election platform said it would be done “firmly and consistently”) and what “better ties with the neighbours” would look like.

Before the elections, Grybauskaitė also implied she would give up the utopian ambition of regional leadership. The Georgian president’s ostentatious shunning during the 11 March celebration was an excellent illustration of this direction. Of course, there were many disagreements over this conception and it is definitely not unequivocal. Europe, too, views Saakashvili as a somewhat strange authoritarian leader. There are a few questions, however: How, then, should we understand the fact that Lukashenka, whose reputation is much worse, was invited to the 11 March celebration (Lukashenka did not even bother to come)? What did the president try to achieve by inviting Lukashenka and by not inviting Saakashvili? Better ties with the neighbours? To receive another golden star from the EU?  Perhaps a golden star from the oligarchs (the one’s the president had promised to crush), who really wanted Lukashenka to come?

Are the ties between Lithuania and Georgia, into which Lithuanian diplomats and President Valdas Adamkus invested a lot of effort, really that useless in the international context? If all that it takes is to exchange a few words with the leader who is not liked by our president, then perhaps it would be wise to retain good relations with Georgia?

An even bigger diplomatic blooper occurred with the newly baked pro-Russian president of Ukraine – Viktor Yanukovich. After being greeted very enthusiastically by Grybauskaitė after the elections, to the 11 March celebration, Yanukovich sent a minister who was no longer minister…

This week we witnessed how the President’s Office, by refusing to meet with Barack Obama in the bilateral meeting, was implementing its election campaign platform notion: “… let us fix the foreign policy pendulum – let strong and consistent efforts to defend Lithuania’s interests replace the country’s merely-imagined leadership in the Euro-Atlantic sphere.”

True, we witnessed only the second part of the statement. Because the refusal to meet with Obama will probably significantly chip away at the progress in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, but, once again, perhaps this will please Europe? Perhaps this is some sort of a smart chess move: Obama’s team is ignoring Eastern Europe anyway, therefore, the meeting will be very nominal, and it is not worth the effort?…

For now this is not clear, because the president’s office and the prime minister’s press service are ostentatious in avoiding commentaries on the invitation replacements related to the Prague visit.

However, the nation should be explained why we were the only nation out of four to decline. Perhaps some sort of a consistent and wise strategy, which is not intended for wider public discussion, indeed leads the President’s Office. In such a case, however, its explanations to the country’s public should also be well thought-through.

The President’s Office should not be content with just a few words thrown together haphazardly, because such actions (politicians’ words are viewed as actions) generate the image of the president as a capricious, unpredictable, and petty person.

Thus, no matter what sort of dirty games the so called statesmen were playing while they were in power, it looks like they were right in saying that the President’s Office destroyed the previous consistent foreign policy and did not offer anything new. Because for now, the President’s Office is making pretty strange and destructive decisions, and who could say what Lithuania’s foreign policy conception is today anyway?…

One wants to ask whether Lithuania has an independent foreign policy at all. Perhaps we simply yield to the EU line? Can this be tied to the speculations that Grybauskaitė is preparing for her further career in the highest EU echelons? Finally, what is that EU line, and what do we get in return? Some sort of an imagined favour or concrete things? Perhaps next time Lithuania’s voice will be listened to regarding the damage of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline, when Russia and Germany will be trying to strike yet another deal behind Europe’s back? Perhaps someday, when the ties with Russia will get sourer, Nicolas Sarkozy, who takes walks with Dmitry Medvedev holding hands and who sells Mistral ships to Russia, will support us? And who was so eager to head the talks between the EU and Russia after the Georgian war that he even forgot about Russia’s obligations.

Lithuania’s good relations with Nordic countries are worthy thing, but we are having no luck in fixing the issues with the biggest political players. The results of the unexpectedly frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin are vague, and we are ostentatiously trying to turn our behinds towards the US. It is hard to say whether we are really trying to become a truly European state, or whether we are finally confirming our status as a regional province that has only one ambition – to survive.

Finally, if the president was consistent in her foreign policy guidelines, perhaps she should think about going to Moscow on 9 May together with the presidents of Latvia and Estonia? This would be a completely-logical continuation of the current policy, and, let us assume, would fix that mystical foreign policy pendulum… Here, however, all of a sudden we started worrying about principles. Or perhaps the uncertainty how the Lithuanian voters would react to this?..

Let us assume that Lithuania is a small country and is no player in the international arena, something that certain political analysts are constantly telling us. This, however, does not mean that we cannot have our own policy or that we should damage it by unpredictable diplomatic extravaganza.

The commentary is published by courtesy of Delfi.lt portal.  The original commentary was published on 2 April