Fredrik Rydström | The Lithuania Tribune
I was once told that the most efficient way of conducting foreign aid with Belarus, and thus enhancing the prospects of democratization, would be to combine Swedish compliance and Norwegian money with Lithuanian knowledge.

Though Norway indeed has more to bring to the table than mere precious oil-money, this statement does nevertheless quite accurately points out the strengths of the abovementioned actors in the process of changing the authoritarian stalemate in Belarus.

As for sharing a common history that stretches back well beyond the Soviet interlude, Lithuania is arguably the EU country which possess the greatest experience and most profound understanding of Belarus.

This is maybe the main reason for the assertiveness with which Lithuania has acted as the self-proclaimed voice of the Belarusian opposition within the EU. There has been more than one occasion when Lithuania’s political representatives has entered high-level international summits followed by members of the Belarusian opposition, much to the dismay of their Western colleges.

Lithuania has, as such, consistently provided the Belarusian opposition with a platform from which it has been able to draw the attention to the practices of a regime that the EU, some experts argue, has chosen to turn their backs on. The reason for this has, prior to the armed conflict in Georgia, mainly been EU’s reluctance to antagonize Russia, although the relations between Minsk and Moscow during the recent years have proven to be less than lukewarm.

The Nordic states, then, have been significantly more active in Belarusian affairs compared to the EU at large; mainly because of their relative independence of Russian energy sources and pronounced concern for human rights issues. Although striving to fulfil basically the same goals, the approach towards Belarusian society and the regime has traditionally varied between Lithuania and the Nordic states; whereas the former has preferred to use diplomatic channels in order to foster political and social change, the latter has favoured to conduct relations within the framework of foreign aid projects.

In the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian crisis, much of the attention has been focused on the Eastern Partnership Programme (EaP), designed and elaborated jointly by Poland and Sweden. Although the Belarusian regime has been showing some interest in participating in the programme, critics have been fast to point out its many weaknesses. One might, for example, question whether the fairly modest funds available for modernization and development initiatives would be of any significant attraction to the regime, especially so since it is to be regarded as mere pin-money compared to the vast debt Belarus has incurred from Russia.

However, while the critique indeed may be accurate, it would be naïve to believe that the implementation of the EaP, regardless of the size of the funds underpinning the programme, would ensue in the unconditional accommodation of political conditionality or the undertaking of an immense reform programme reminiscent of perestroika. Instead, the strengths of the EaP lie in its elaborate mechanisms to promote reform in certain key institutions which, in turn, is envisioned to gradually change the mindset of society. Hence, the main long-term aim being to absorb Belarus into the European orbit.

It was against this backdrop of a revitalized dialogue with Belarus that the EU launched its policy of “engagement”, with the aim to break the self-imposed isolation of the country. This development should indeed be viewed as encouraging, especially so since the EU, until recently, seems to have equated Alexander Lukashenka with Belarus, which is to play right into the hands of the dictator. Moreover, with the apartheid regime in South Africa being the exception that proves the rule, efforts to isolate regimes which fails to comply with the rules of conduct set by the international community has, time and again, proven to be unsuccessful at best, and disastrous at worst.

However, though the policy of “engagement” seems as a promising initiative as it aims to increase interaction between the EU and Belarus, there is other vital actors, apart from a capricious regime and a muzzled opposition, involved in the struggle for democratization and reform which deserves the attention and support from the EU. In order to achieve long-term and sustained social and political change it will be of fundamental importance to create arenas for socio-cultural interaction and exchange between EU citizens and Belarusian people in general, and youth in particular.

As for now, the lion’s share of EU’s foreign aid is channelized into support for the fragmented Belarusian opposition. Notwithstanding the fact that that the beleaguered opposition forces are filling a political void in Belarusian society and therefore should be accommodated with all means possible, one should also acknowledge that this approach so far has produced rather meagre results. Instead of concentrating funds solely on the endorsement of the Belarusian opposition, it seems vital that money should be distributed among a larger number of social actors, and especially those who contribute to enhance the dialogue between Belarusian and Western civic groupings.

Lithuania had, prior to entering the Schengen agreement, adopted a fairly generous visa regime vis-à-vis Belarus which made is possible for Belarusian citizens to obtain a temporary visa to a considerably lower price than that which were stipulated within the Schengen zone. It is of course impossible to measure or correctly assess the impact this kind of policy could have on Belarusian society, but it seems plausible enough to suggest that the experience of interacting with people and institutions within a democratic society could stimulate a change of perception about the blunt authoritarianism prevailing in one’s own society. This policy unfortunately had to change as Lithuania had to comply with EU regulations on a common visa regime when acceding to the Schengen agreement in 2007.

A policy in the Nordic states which seems to have been equally efficient in terms of increasing the prospects of democratization in Belarus through cultural and social interaction was that of a free and universal university education. This meant that Belarusian students, among others, could receive a free university education of their choice and the possibility to indulge in social activities outside the narrow confines prevailing within their own society.

In 2006 Denmark decided to delimit the number of foreign students with the possibility to receive free university education by stipulating that only students from within the EEC and Switzerland were to be granted this opportunity. Finland and Sweden followed suit in 2009 when their respective parliaments passed a similar law. Consequently, the dismantling of this particular institution does not only increase inequality, as it is students from the most prosperous countries that remain unobligated to pay for their education, but it might also have dire consequences, albeit indirectly, for the prospects of enhancing democratization.

Nonetheless, apart from these setbacks, it will be interesting to see how Lithuania and the Nordic states will develop its efforts to enhance the prospects for democratization in Belarus, and how they are to act within the new EU policy framework of “engagement”. What is clear, however, is that their positions as forerunners in this process are likely to continue.

Although there are few incitements to coordinate efforts and policymaking within the field of foreign aid outside the framework provided by the EU, considering the disparities in the approach between the Nordic states on the one hand and Lithuania on the other, such an attempt could nevertheless be beneficial for both parties.

Though Lithuania may lack the funds, skills and experience of conducting foreign aid in the elaborated manner established in the Nordic states, the latter’s expertise in this field has, to a great extent, been acquired through collaboration with the Baltic States during the phase of reconstruction and transitional ordeal. Prior to the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, Nordic, and especially Swedish foreign policy, had an ideological penchant for “palm-leaf socialism” in the Third World and were likely to target experimental regimes with little respect for human rights. Among the beneficiaries were Robert Mugabe, Fidel Castro and Daniel Ortega, just to name a few. Consequently, given their understanding of Belarusian culture and society, Lithuania should, in this perspective, definitely possess the skills to evaluate and outline the apparent strength and weaknesses of Nordic foreign aid.

It might also be in place with a reminder of that Lithuania will take over EU’s rotating presidency in 2013. And although the powers invested in the presidency do not give Lithuania the prerogatives to direct EU’s unwieldy machinery after its own accord, it does nonetheless bestow Lithuania with the privilege to shape the agenda.

This has intermittently proven to be a distinct advantage as far as foreign policymaking is concerned. When Sweden held the presidency in 2001 and Denmark in 2002, their joint efforts paved the way for the 2004 “big bang” enlargement which ensued in that Latvia and Lithuania was granted membership together with those Central and Eastern European countries which previously were deemed to be far ahead in the accession process.

In 2013, therefore, Lithuania will be given the possibility to turn the EU’s attention towards its post-Soviet eastern neighbours. Though the short-term advantages of such an approach may turn out to be modest, it should be viewed as an opportunity for Lithuania to play a significant role in EU’s foreign policy making, and the effort would most certainly be met with acclaim among the people residing southeast of the Lithuanian border.

Fredrik Rydström is a distinguished academic from Sweden who graduated Vilnius University in Spring 2010. He has lived for almost two years in Lithuania where he ound true love: the kibinas. Fredrik has held several lectures about and specialized in Baltic-Nordic relations.

Other articles by Fredrik Rydström
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Eco-efficiency and ketchup on pizza

Lithuania’s white gold

Teachers and pupils; LGBT, Lithuania and Nordics

BaltoScandia:to have (or not) a laugh at the expense of your neighbours