A Latvian daily Neatkariga published an article suggesting that it might have been in the interest of the EU to push the Baltic countries into a deeper dependency on the Russian energy recourses in order to reduce their capacity of having an independent foreign policy.  Juris Paiders published the article on 1 March.

The author starts with the closer of Ignalina nuclear power plant on January 1 of this year when the Baltic States still have not created any significant power network linkages with EU member states. Not even the fact that a Latvian served one term as the EU’s energy commissioner helped in this. The energy dependency of the Baltic States on Russia has increased, not decreased, since they joined the EU. There is only one interconnection – the Estlink cable which hooks up Tallinn and Helsinki. All of the rest remains on paper.

When concern about this situation is discussed at the EU level, there is sometimes not even a statement of condolences for those NATO and EU member states that have been forced to become energy-dependent on Russia. What has been the point of all of this? Why did Lithuania’s entrance treaty with the EU include the rule of closing down the Ignalina plant if, six years after joining the EU, that increased the dependency of the Baltic States on Russia? How can we explain such an odd understanding of European integration?

Business Interests
On the one hand,  the author says, the demand to close down the Ignalina nuclear power plant was pretty clearly based in part on French business interests. That is how, ten years ago, the cornerstone was laid for a situation, which would force the Baltic States to change their energy capacities by buying services from French companies. There were surely certain business interests in all of this. Ten years ago the EU and the rest of the world were still dominated by negative views about nuclear power. Everyone clearly remembered the terrors of Chernobyl, and greens got one European country after another to abandon plans for new plants. Companies which manufacture nuclear power plants had to look for markets for their services, and bans on the use of older plants in Eastern Europe created good growth for businesses which can offer a replacement of technologies.

Shifting Views on Nuclear Power
The author states that it is only over the last ten years that attitudes towards nuclear power have changed radically. The price of fossil fuels has skyrocketed, and a global decision was taken to reduce carbon emissions. Nuclear power plants do not have any carbon emissions. Now there are more orders for nuclear plants than the qualified manufacturers can absorb. They can now make a choice between humble orders from poor countries (one bloc of 600 MW), or an order from Great Britain or India to build 20 plants. Small countries, therefore, find it hard to get a good price. The bottom line is that Ignalina has been shut down, but alternatives are still only being drafted.

One consequence of this is clear. Latvia and the Baltic States are now far more dependent on Russia than they were before they joined the EU. Could it be that exactly that was the long-term goal?

Mr. Paiders asks what kind of Baltic States do other EU member states need? Is the EU interested in bringing in a periphery in the East that might become a regular treat against regional security? Does it want to bring in countries, which annoy and challenge their eastern neighbours?

No, it does not, and EU leaders say so both officially and unofficially. It is in the interests of the EU to admit countries, which have maximally good relations with their neighbours, and particularly with Russia.

US Interests
Meanwhile, according to the author, it was in the interests of other global political players (especially America during the Bush era) to ensure that countries that could torpedo and delay any rapprochement between the EU and Russia whenever that was needed joined the EU. It is specifically because of such interests that the EU must have countries, which have latent conflicts with neighbours to the East. As soon as there is a global need, an invisible hand will inflate the conflicts, and Russia’s rapprochement with the EU will be prevented. Lithuania and Poland, for instance, blocked the launch of negotiations with Russia for several months on end.

The author noticed that,  there are certain limits to the rhetoric, which Baltic politicians allow themselves to engage in when it comes to annoying Russia. The Baltic States are linked in a single energy system with Russia. Politicians in the Baltic States can annoy their eastern neighbour only until the patients of the people is exhausted. Russia can shut down gas deliveries, as it has done with Ukraine. It can build alternatives to become independent from links to Poland and the Baltic States. That is why Primorsk, Ustylug and Nordstream were created. Each time there is an unmotivated escapade in Latvian foreign policy, there can be economic costs, which would be felt first and foremost by local residents. It was specifically the energy dependency that put the brakes on the policies of the Baltic States in terms of serving the interests of their global partners.

It is precisely energy dependency on Russia, Mr Paiders concludes, that limits Latvia’s foreign policy rhetoric, and that is a lever, which forces Latvia to maintain at least more or less normal relations with Russia. The European Union wants Baltic States that are European. They want Baltic States that are a part of Europe’s common foreign policy, not ones that represent the American “fifth column” within the EU. That is why it is possible that the EU was specifically interested in not increasing the level of energy independence in the Baltic States, thus creating conditions in which the Baltic political elite learns not only to live with Russia, but also to use their geographic location to serve their own interests and those of the EU.