Finally, Russia pulled out her armed forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and terminated the occupation of these Georgian territories, it is not going to create plans in case of crisis to block the ships of NATO countries and the provision of backup in the Baltic Sea, it has investigated all the violations of human rights, all the crimes committed against humanity and war crimes executed in Chechnya, has punished the guilty, has rebuffed from the concepts of the near abroad and the zone of the special interests, is not denying any more the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states and the restoration of Lithuanian independence on the 11th of March, 1990.

One could get such an impression last Monday (February the 8th) when it was announced that France is possibly going to sell to Russia a military ship of “Mistral” class, which is of amphibian type and is capable to bring to urgent operations several battalions of soldiers, tanks and other combatant cargo, helicopters (thus, it is being planned to sell a ship, which anywhere in the “near neighbourhood” could be used as a platform for any several-hours-long special operation of an offensive character). The criteria, confirmed by the European Union for the export of weapons, makes one to dream this French dream, because according to this criteria weaponry can be sold only for those states that comply to the principle of non-use of force, does not cause a threat for the neighbours and the EU member states, does not violate human rights. It could seem that the decision of France shows, that France considers Russia as exactly a state, complying with these criteria or would like to consider it as such at least in a dream.

Unfortunately, the reality seems to be completely different than that one of the French dream. On the 8th of December 2008, in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Council of the European Union adopted a Common position 2008/944/CFSP by which the general rules for the control of military technology and equipment were defined. This Common position replaced the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export (adopted in 1998), which was in action till the adoption of the new Position, and which had essentially an identical content. The 2nd article of the Common position defines the criteria, resting upon which decisions, concerning exports of weaponry, should be made. In total eight criteria that should be taken into consideration are indicated and revealed. While selling a ship of „Mistral“ class for Russia, France is seemingly disregarding even four of these criteria.

First, the first criterion would be disregarded, which indicates that while making a decision on the sale of weaponry, respect for human rights and humanitarian law in the purchasing state should be taken into consideration.

Especially such severe violations of human rights as tournaments and inhuman treatment of other kind, non-judicial executions, forced disappearances should be taken into consideration.

The European Court of Human Rights has so far investigated more than 40 cases of violations of human rights in Chechnya, in these cases it is stipulated that Russia is responsible for the mass massacres of civic people, executed by her military forces (non-judicial executions, i.e., immediately in the street shooting at women and children, burning their corpses, attacking the caravans of war refugees), for their torments in the places of unauthorized detainment (in such concentration camps like

Chernokozov), for disappearance of many people (herewith, the Court stressed that the forced disappearances is a mass phenomenon in Chechnya).

The decision of France on the “Mistral” ship could demonstrate that all the EU countries are on equality with each other and solidary with, however some of them enjoy more equality than others, and solidarity, according to the French point of view, should only mean an approval to her aforementioned sweet dream about the trustworthy democratic partner Russia. Out of these cases one can make conclusions about crimes against humanity and war crimes, committed by Russia, however, one still has not heard about effective investigations of these crimes and the punishment of the guilty (the European Court of Human Rights has just noticed that Russia is not fulfilling her duty to investigate the violations if human rights). It is not even worth to write about other violations of human rights, executed in different regions of Russia. It’s just possible to remind that most of the petitions, submitted to the European Court of Human Rights are directed against Russia.

Second, one of the most important and relevant criterion, defined in the 2 nd article of the Common position is the third criterion, which notes that it is necessary to take into consideration the interests of regional peace, security and stability. In other words, weaponry should not be sold, if it can be used for aggression against the other country and satisfaction of territorial pretensions.

It is obvious that the decision of France to sell the “Mistral” ship to Russia is contradicting to the aforementioned criterion, as the representatives of Russian armed forces have declared that by purchasing this kind of a ship, Russia would compensate present deficiencies of her capacities and would be more effective in the sea while reacting to the actions of Georgian forces, while “defending Abkhazia and South Ossetia”. So, an intent to use, in case of a need, a ship, which is planned to be purchased, for aggressive actions against Georgia, for the continuation of the occupation of the parts of her territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

Third, the decision of France would obviously contradict to the fifth criterion, which demands to take into consideration the security interests of the other EU countries, as well as the ally countries (i.e., those of the other NATO countries), as well as of the other friendly states (though Georgia’s). One *inter alia*, should take into consideration the risks of using the purchased weaponry against the armed forces of the other EU or NATO members. The appearance of the ship, purchased by Russia, in the Baltic Sea would cause a reasoned concern of the Baltic states about Russia’s soar away military potential, and, what is most important, in a critical case, this ship could be used for announced and simulated in the war games Russia’s plans to prevent the backup, provided by the other NATO members to the Baltic states across the Baltic Sea and to block the entrance for the military ships of the NATO countries to the Baltic Sea.

Fourth, the decision of France would also be incompatible with the sixth criterion which *inter alia* indicates to take into consideration the way, how the purchasing state is regarding international law, especially the commitments of non-use of force. It seems that the most eloquent indicator of Russia’s point of view to the international commitments of non-use of force is the continuing occupation of the parts of Georgia’s territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the fact that the six-clause plan, which was undersigned in August 2008, under the intermediation of the French president, and according to which Russia committed herself to withdraw her forces to those positions that she had before the commencement of military actions against Georgia, was not implemented.

On the contrary, international law is being violated further on and more severely while Russia is recognizing the puppet “state” bodies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In such a context the fact that while conflicting to the international law and commitments under the bilateral Treaty of interstate relations, Russia is denying the restoration of Lithuania’s independence on the 11 March, 1990 and is making an attempt to the very basement of Lithuania’s statehood, looks like a tiny thing.

While seeing that France is going to disregard the criteria for weaponry purchasing, established in the Common position, it is also necessary also to state, that in such a case France would not comply with the 29th article of the treaty of the European Union (until the Treaty of Lisbon it was named as the 15th article), which is committing the member states to ensure that their national policies are complying to the common positions of the EU.  And in general such a decision of France would be incompatible with the principle of solidarity between member states, which is established in the EU Treaty (i.e., the 3rd section of the 24th article of the Treaty stipulates that the member states should in the spirit of solidarity support Common Foreign and Security Policy, develop mutual political solidarity).

According to the EU criteria, for the exports of weaponry, weaponry can be sold only for those states that comply to the principle of the non-use of force, are not causing threat for the neighbouring countries and EU members, are not violating human rights.

Of course, France could start claiming that it is possible not to apply the Common position, because she will ostensibly sell the ship without weaponry, only as a platform and for civic purposes. However, only very naïve people or those who pretend to be like that could believe that in such a ship no modern weaponry will be placed and it will be used only for catching sprats, crabs and other seafood or for rescuing the fisherman. Moreover, one also has to be deaf and not to hear the dreams of the chief of the Russian military fleet about opening possibilities of quick operations against Georgia, when the “Mistral” ship will be purchased.

France also could support the formal attitude while claiming that the Common positions of the EU are the documentation that is more politically than legally binding, as there’re no effective legal means to force the states to regard this documentation (i.e., an analogical responsibility procedure for the violation of the legal acts of other areas while submitting a claim to the Court of Justice of the European Communities is impossible).  However, after having adopted this attitude, one should turn one’s back to the idea of solidarity and the EU, as union of countries, cherishing common values.

Solidarity is not and cannot be only a formal legal category that is allowing disregarding national security interests of the other EU states and international security interests in general.  The contents of the real solidarity is revealed, having in mind not so much legal, but its moral and political aspect, which presupposes not unilateralism, but regarding the interests of the club of other EU states, the search for common attitudes and common decisions. Usually France, while encouraging the deepening of integration, also used to advocate such a conception of the solidarity between the EU members.

Meanwhile now it seems that France’s decision on the “Mistral” ship would demonstrate, that all the EU countries are on a equality with each other and solidary with, however, some of them enjoy more equality than the others, and solidarity, according to the view of France, should only mean an approval for her aforementioned sweet dream about the trustworthy, democratic partner Russia. Similarly, solidarity should mean an approval for the dreams of Germany, according which the “Nord Stream” gas pipe is “nothing else than business and no politics” and will not cause any threat for the energetic security of the other EU states.

Thus, looking from the perspectives of Lithuania and other Central Europe countries, being solidary with and loyal soon can mean unconditional implementation of EU legal and common positions on foreign and security policy questions, when the great and old EU members (such as France) can afford themselves to ignore these positions, by raising, in cases of need, some formal arguments or simply pretending that the reality is such as they would like it to be. Namely, “Mistral” can create such a French precedent of solidarity.

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The commentary is published by courtesy of Prof. Dainius Žalimas.  The author is an Associate Professor at Vilnius University, Faculty of Law.  The original article was published on delfi.lt